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PATENTS V. ANTITRUST:
PREEMPTING CONFLICT
MATTHEW G. SIPE*

The dissonance between patent law and antitrust law has persisted despite a
century of attempts at harmonization. This Article suggests an elegant, novel
solution: preemption doctrine. Recognizing the limits of and costs associated
with antitrust law, the U.S. Supreme Court has already held that where an
alternative regulatory authority exists—and overlapping application of antitrust
regulation would lead to conflict—antitrust law may be implicitly preempted.
But this doctrine remains almost entirely unexplored. This Article applies
preemption doctrine precedent to the patent-antitrust context, analyzing where
patent regulatory authority exists and where simultaneous antitrust regulation
is likely to generate conflicting guidance and requirements. Under the Court’s
precedent, this combination of overlap and conflict should be enough to support
preemption, at least within certain categories of patent cases. Moreover, this
Article explores how the unique nature of patents and the interplay—and
tension—that patent law alone has with antitrust law supports an even
broader interpretation of existing preemption doctrine in this context.
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“The conflict between the antitrust and patent laws arises in the methods
they embrace that were designed to achieve reciprocal goals. While the antitrust
laws proscribe unreasonable restraints of competition, the patent laws reward
the inventor with a temporary monopoly that insulates him from competitive
exploitation of his patented art.” 1

INTRODUCTION
The patent-antitrust paradox has generally defied resolution.
Attempts to either “graft antitrust doctrines onto patent law” or vice
versa have “spawned almost a century of consternation and conflict,”
and offered little in the way of clarity or progress.2 This conflict has long
inspired influential writing from a number of academics in its own

1. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203–04 (2d Cir. 1981).
2. Robin Feldman, Patent and Antitrust: Differing Shades of Meaning, 13 VA. J.L. &
TECH., Spring 2008, at 1, 2–3.
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right.3 But the recent explosion of patent applications, grants, licenses,
and infringement suits has made the dissonance between the two fields
increasingly apparent—and redoubled efforts at harmonization.
Thus far, however, the discourse on patent law and antitrust law
has largely overlooked a particularly elegant solution, informed by
two relatively noncontroversial axioms. First: where two fields of law
are in dire conflict, preemption dictates that one may retreat.4
Second: antitrust law should generally be the solution of last resort to
a given problem.5 With these principles in mind, where patent law
offers its own solutions to potentially anticompetitive patent schemes,
preemption may eliminate the tension that would otherwise be
created by allowing antitrust law to simultaneously—and
discordantly—intervene.
In some ways, the preemption solution to the patent-antitrust
puzzle is not novel. The aforementioned principles have, in fact,
already been approved and used together by the U.S. Supreme Court
in a different context. In Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing,6
the Court relied on those principles in holding that securities law can
preempt antitrust law. And yet, the natural extension of this logic to
patent law has received almost no attention.7 This Article takes up the

3. See, e.g., LAURENCE I. WOOD, PATENTS AND ANTITRUST LAW xiv, 211 (1942)
(discussing that courts must delineate between patent and antitrust conflicts on a
case-by-case basis to determine when the “public good is [better] served by a given
practice”); John H. Barton, Patents and Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light of Patent Breadth
and Sequential Innovation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 449, 450–51, 465 (1997) (asserting that
incentives for research and technological innovation must be considered when
balancing antitrust and patent laws); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason and the
Scope of the Patent, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 515, 515–16, 553–54 (2015) (arguing that the
“scope of the patent” metaphor is useful primarily in assessing conduct under patent
law, not antitrust law); S. Chesterfield Oppenheim, Patents and Antitrust: Peaceful
Coexistence?, 54 MICH. L. REV. 199, 200–03, 218 (1955) (concluding that “patents and
antitrust can lead a peaceful coexistence . . . in fulfillment of the public interest”); George
L. Priest, Cartels and Patent License Arrangements, 20 J.L. & ECON. 309, 309–10, 376–77
(1977) (proposing methods to better evaluate how certain patent license agreements
affect antitrust principles).
4. The essential—though not exclusive—example, of course, being where state
and federal law conflict. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (establishing the
supremacy of federal law over contrary state law); Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K.
Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1303 (2009) (discussing how
displacement of state law by federal law has “assumed an expansive breadth” in
Supreme Court jurisprudence).
5. See infra Part I.
6. 551 U.S. 264 (2007).
7. The sole exception that this author found is Professors Kobayashi and
Wright’s article considering how Credit Suisse might be applied in one particular type
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task of that extension, analyzing the merits of preemption as applied
to the patent-antitrust context.
Part I of this Article describes the major criticisms and drawbacks
of antitrust law and their recognition and incorporation into
Supreme Court jurisprudence. Part I also explains how this antitrust
skepticism crystallized into an antitrust-specific preemption test, as
stated in Credit Suisse : where an alternative regulatory authority is
exercising supervision, and simultaneously applying antitrust
supervision would lead to conflict, antitrust law is preempted.
Parts II, III, and IV use this test as a framework to determine the
types of cases in which patent law logically ought to preempt antitrust
law. Specifically, Part II analyzes the sources of regulatory authority
in the patent context—the Patent and Trademark Office, the
International Trade Commission, and the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit—and their different spheres of authority and
deference. Part III uses that analysis to create a hierarchy of
potentially anticompetitive patent activities, categorizing them based
on the degree to which they are already under supervision from
patent authorities.
Part IV then examines the potential for
conflicting guidance and outcomes where antitrust supervision
overlaps that patent supervision.
Part V moves beyond this framework, attempting to broaden the
analysis underpinning the Supreme Court’s antitrust-skeptical
jurisprudence. It introduces additional arguments in favor of
preemption based on the unique nature of patents and the
interplay—and tension—that patent law alone has with antitrust law.
It argues that because the Court’s case law in this area has essentially
elevated policy considerations into doctrinal ones, these additional
arguments should be given significant weight moving forward.
I.

ANTITRUST SKEPTICISM AND PREEMPTION

The profound criticisms leveled against antitrust law by academics
should be deeply troubling to any jurist concerned with efficiency or
fairness. The text of the antitrust statutes is highly vague and openof patent case: patent “hold up.” See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Joshua D. Wright,
Federalism, Substantive Preemption, and Limits on Antitrust: An Application to Patent
Holdup, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 469, 469–70 (2009). Their analysis, however,
exclusively covers the hold-up context and addresses a variety of potentially
preempting areas of state and federal law. This Article focuses solely on the potential
for patent law to preempt antitrust law and compares that potential across all types of
patent cases. The professors’ insightful and novel analysis inspired some of the
central themes found herein, for which this author is significantly indebted.
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ended,8 leading to a common law—almost constitutional—approach
to interpretation9 that may be fundamentally incompatible with
antitrust law’s regulatory purpose.10 The heavy penalties for antitrust
violations—felony convictions and treble damages11—make concerns
over vagueness all the more pressing; the cost of false positives or
good-faith missteps is exceptionally high.12 What’s more, the highly
technical analysis required for antitrust adjudication makes any given
trial time-consuming and costly.13 This technical focus tends to
confound layperson juries,14 who are already biased against large

8. See, e.g., Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (forbidding any
“contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce”). Of
course, all contracts restrain trade or commerce because they “bind[] two parties to
each other in some fashion, thus preventing them from doing that business with
anyone else without incurring the costs of breach.” Matthew Sipe, Patent Privateers
and Antitrust Fears, 22 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 191, 223 n.174 (2016).
9. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899
(2007)(“From the beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a commonlaw statute.”); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997)(“[T]he general
presumption that legislative changes should be left to Congress has less force with
respect to the Sherman Act.”); Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 600
(1936) (“We have said that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act . . . has a generality and
adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions.”).
10. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION
10 (2005) (“Antitrust is an economic, not a moral, enterprise.”); Daniel A. Crane,
Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1160–61, 1221 (2008) (advocating for
greater technocracy in antitrust law and less reliance on the common-law
adjudicatory approach).
11. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2, 15(a).
12. See Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 7, at 472 (acknowledging that the
application of antitrust laws can “trigger ‘serious errors,’” and that limiting their
enforcement can lead to “comparative advantages” from “alternative institutions . . .
to antitrust”); see also Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Law and Economics of Predatory Pricing,
in ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 116, 130 (Keith N. Hylton ed., 2010) (recognizing
the Supreme Court’s concern with the “high relative costs of [antitrust regulation]
falsely condemning pro-competitive pricing behavior”).
13. See Rebecca Haw, Adversarial Economics in Antitrust Litigation: Losing Academic
Consensus in the Battle of the Experts, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1261, 1262, 1264–65 (2012)
(analyzing methods to reduce the substantial time and cost associated with using
economic expert witnesses in modern antitrust lawsuits).
14. See Arthur Austin, The Jury System at Risk from Complexity, the New Media, and
Deviancy, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 51, 52–59 (1995) (“[T]he jurors were overwhelmed,
frustrated, and confused by testimony well beyond their comprehension. . . . [A]t no
time did any juror grasp—even at the margins—the law, the economics, or any other
testimony relating to the allegations or defense.”); Crane, supra note 10, at 1183
(“[M]odern antitrust cases consist of very few tasks that require identifying moral
culpability, the degree of the defendant’s wrongdoing, or other matters for which
the jury’s populist function is well suited.”).
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corporations and naïve to standard business practices.15 In short,
there is good reason to be skeptical of imbuing the antitrust laws with
broad scope, particularly in areas where a less costly legal regime
could be used to reach the same goals.16
These criticisms have gained significant traction outside of purely
academic circles, finding footholds in the courts themselves. In
particular, the Supreme Court has increasingly voiced serious
skepticism towards a broadly-conceived role for antitrust law. Since
what might be considered the “high-water mark” of aggressive
antitrust enforcement in the 1960s and 70s,17 the Court has expressed

15. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 214–15 (2d ed. 2001) (“Especially
misleading is the inveterate tendency of sales executives to brag to their superiors
about their competitive prowess, often using metaphors of coercion that are
compelling evidence of predatory intent to the naïve.”); Barbara S. Swain & Dan R.
Gallipeau, What They Bring to Court: Juror Attitudes in Antitrust Cases, 8 ANTITRUST,
Summer 1994, at 14, 15–17 (“In some venues, as many as 75 percent of the jurors
think that large corporations regularly use unethical and unfair tactics to bully
smaller competitors and squeeze them out of the marketplace.”).
16. Professor Jonathan Baker offers perhaps the most thorough critique of the
antitrust-skeptical position. See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the Error out of
“Error Cost” Analysis: What’s Wrong with Antitrust’s Right, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2015).
In particular, Professor Baker examines certain assumptions underlying antitrust
skepticism, ranging from economic (are cartels truly self-defeating?) to institutional
(is antitrust liability truly uncertain ex ante?). Id. at 12–14, 30–32. To the extent that
Professor Baker’s arguments are persuasive regarding antitrust law generally, they are
nevertheless not attuned to the specific context of antitrust law overlapping with
patents—an overlap that offers significant and unique reasons to be skeptical. See
infra Parts IV, V (discussing the risk of conflict between the goals of patent law and
those of antitrust enforcement).
17. See KY P. EWING, JR., COMPETITION RULES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: PRINCIPLES
FROM AMERICA’S EXPERIENCE 128 (2d ed. 2006) (recognizing the period from the
1960s to 1970s as one where courts demonstrated great deference to government
actions halting corporate mergers); see also BERNICE ROTHMAN HASIN, CONSUMERS,
COMMISSIONS, AND CONGRESS: LAW, THEORY, AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
1968–1985, at 48 (1987) (describing court rulings that stopped corporate mergers as
furthering the “judicial goal of small business protection” due to a “fear of economic
concentration”); Dennis A. Yao, Commissioner, FTC, Prepared Remarks Before the
Illinois State Bar Association and the Chicago Bar Association, Challenges in Merger
Analysis:
The 1992 Merger Guidelines and Beyond 1–4 (Dec. 2, 1992),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/694541/19921202
_yao_challenges_in_merger_analysis-_the_1992_merger_guidelines_and_beyond.pdf
(stating that in previous years, only about two percent of pre-merger filings “required
in-depth investigation” while the vast majority were allowed to proceed, in stark
contrast to mergers halted by the Court in the 1960s and 70s). Ewing, Hasin, and
Yao were all referring largely to the Court’s holding in United States v. Von’s Grocery
Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966), which prohibited the merger of two grocery stores that had
only single-digit market share when combined.
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greater and greater cynicism about the efficiency and efficacy of
antitrust law in practice.
For example, in NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc.,18 the Court held that
the per se rule against group boycotts did not apply to a single
“buyer’s decision to buy from one seller rather than another.”19
While its holding rested “in large part upon precedent,” the Court
noted as additional support that other legal regimes—including
“‘unfair competition’ laws, business tort laws, or regulatory laws”—
could provide remedies in unilateral supplier-switching cases instead
of antitrust law.20 Moreover, the Court reasoned, those alternative
regimes would be less likely to chill competitors from changing
suppliers for legitimate business purposes.21
This idea of antitrust law as a blunt instrument of last resort was
expanded further in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis
V. Trinko, LLP.22 In Trinko, a class of local telephone service providers
alleged that Verizon had failed to fulfill its obligation to share access
to its telephone network and support systems as required by the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA).23 The class argued that this
failure was part of an anticompetitive scheme to harm local providers,
constituting a violation of the Sherman Act in addition to the TCA.24
The Court disagreed, determining that “pre-existing antitrust
standards” did not prohibit Verizon’s conduct, and that an expansion
of antitrust law to create such a prohibition was not warranted.25
Despite the TCA having an antitrust-specific savings clause,26 the
Court’s reluctance to expand antitrust law was largely predicated on
the fact that the TCA existed as an alternative to police Verizon’s
allegedly anticompetitive conduct.27 That is, even though the TCA by
its own terms did not modify, impair, or supersede the antitrust laws,
the Court nevertheless determined that its existence made antitrust
intervention unnecessary, and the Court supported a narrow view of
antitrust law in the telecommunications sphere, generally:
18. 525 U.S. 128 (1998).
19. Id. at 130.
20. Id. at 135, 137.
21. See id. at 136–37.
22. 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
23. Id. at 404–05; see 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2), (3) (2012).
24. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 404–05.
25. Id. at 407–08, 410–11.
26. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b)(1) (“[N]othing in this Act . . . or the amendments made
by this Act shall be construed to modify, impair, or supersede the applicability of any
of the antitrust laws.”).
27. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411–14.
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One factor of particular importance is the existence of a regulatory
structure designed to deter and remedy anticompetitive harm. Where
such a structure exists, the additional benefit to competition provided
by antitrust enforcement will tend to be small, and it will be less
plausible that the antitrust laws contemplate such additional scrutiny.
Where, by contrast, “[t]here is nothing built into the regulatory
scheme which performs the antitrust function,” the benefits of
antitrust are worth its sometimes considerable disadvantages.28

The Court’s analysis was accompanied by a “realistic assessment” of
the considerable disadvantages noted at the outset of this Part,
including the high cost of “false positives,” the potential to “chill”
legitimate conduct, and the “highly technical” analysis required.29
Only three years later, the Supreme Court would crystallize this
skepticism and concern into a more concrete form: antitrust
preemption doctrine. In Credit Suisse, a group of investors alleged that
a group of investment banks acting as underwriters had violated
antitrust laws when they created syndicates to assist in executing initial
public offerings for several hundred companies.30 In particular, the
investors claimed that the banks had agreed amongst themselves to
only sell newly issued securities to buyers if the buyers agreed to certain
terms, including a commitment to purchase additional shares later at a
higher price.31 The Court noted that, unlike in Trinko, the securities
laws contained neither a savings clause nor a preemption clause,
leaving only the possibility of implicit preemption.32
Determining that the key question was whether antitrust and
securities law are “clearly incompatible,”33 the Court set forth four
factors to consider:
(1) [T]he existence of regulatory authority under the securities law
to supervise the activities in question; (2) evidence that the
responsible regulatory entities exercise that authority; and (3) a
resulting risk that the securities and antitrust laws, if both
applicable, would produce conflicting guidance, requirements,
duties, privileges, or standards of conduct. We also note (4) that in
[prior cases] the possible conflict affected practices that lie

28. Id. at 412 (citation omitted) (quoting Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341,
358 (1963)).
29. Id. at 414.
30. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 269 (2007).
31. Id. at 269–70.
32. Id. at 270–71 (“Where regulatory statutes are silent in respect to antitrust . . .
courts must determine whether, and in what respects, they implicitly preclude
application of the antitrust laws.”).
33. Id. at 275.
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squarely within an area of financial market activity that the
securities law seeks to regulate.34

The Court found that all four factors counseled in favor of
incompatibility, holding that the securities laws had implicitly
preempted the antitrust laws in that context—“efforts jointly to
promote and to sell newly issued securities”—and rejecting the
investors’ antitrust claims as a result.35
The Court devoted most of its attention in Credit Suisse to the third
factor: whether the securities and antitrust laws, when both are
applicable, would produce conflicting guidance, requirements,
duties, privileges, or standards of conduct. Noting the “fine,
complex, detailed line” separating activity the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) permits and activity the SEC forbids,36
the “need for securities-related expertise” in adjudication, the
“contradictory inferences” that antitrust law and securities law draw,
and the “risk of inconsistent court results,” the Court determined that
“antitrust courts are likely to make unusually serious mistakes” where
they intervene with securities law.37 The Court coupled this analysis
with a reiteration of the arguments in Trinko and the discussion
above, including the high cost of false positives with antitrust law and
the accompanying “chilling effect,” as well as the “unusually small”
need for antitrust intervention where an alternative regulatory
framework operates.38
Discussing the different procedural
requirements for antitrust and securities lawsuits, the Court also
highlighted the risk of “permitting plaintiffs to dress what is
essentially a securities complaint in antitrust clothing” to avoid
securities procedures.39
The Court has not since revisited its analysis in Credit Suisse or
provided further examples of what fields of law might be clearly
incompatible with—and, hence, preempt—antitrust law.40 With
34. Id. at 275–76.
35. Id. at 276, 285.
36. Id. at 279.
37. Id. at 281–82.
38. Id. at 283.
39. Id. at 284.
40. Nor have any lower courts addressed the relationship between patent laws
and antitrust laws under the Credit Suisse preemption framework. Lower courts have,
however, applied the Credit Suisse test to preempt antitrust law in other cases. See, e.g.,
Elec. Trading Grp., LLC v. Banc of Am. Sec. LLC, 588 F.3d 128, 133, 137–38 (2d Cir.
2009) (holding that securities regulations regarding certain short-selling practices
had preempted the antitrust laws); Horisons Unlimited v. Santa Cruz-MontereyMerced Managed Med. Care Comm’n, No. 1:14-CV-00123-LJO-MJS, 2014 WL
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Credit Suisse in mind, however, the prima facie case for patent law
preempting antitrust law is strong. Even the most basic activity
permitted by a patent—excluding and eliminating direct
competition—would attract antitrust scrutiny in any other context.
The same cannot be said for the mere buying and selling of securities.
This does not simply suggest that patent law and antitrust law have a
unique tension between them—although that alone does indicate that
permitting the two to overlap will likely produce dissonant results.
Rather, it suggests that the basic elements of patent law must exist as a
carve-out or exception to antitrust law to begin with. Merely extending
that carve-out to encompass more complex patent activities through
preemption is, therefore, in some ways a smaller and more
straightforward step than the one the Court made in Credit Suisse.
Although the prima facie case for preemption is thus reasonably
clear, it is worth noting that in FTC v. Actavis, Inc.,41 the Court’s most
recent examination of overlapping patent law and antitrust law, there
is no mention of Credit Suisse or preemption. Actavis concerned the
practice of so-called reverse-payment settlements: the owner of a drug
patent, rather than risk a finding of non-infringement or invalidity at
trial, simply pays the creator of a generic substitute to not bring its
drug to market.42
The Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s
conclusion that “a reverse payment settlement agreement generally is
‘immune from antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall
within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent,’” holding
that dismissal of the FTC’s complaint was therefore improper.43 One
might plausibly extrapolate from the opinion that a marriage of equals
between patent law and antitrust law is forthcoming or that the
opinion signals a trend away from antitrust skepticism generally. This
Article, however, argues that Actavis is actually in harmony with Credit
Suisse and guided at least in part by the same principles. Specifically,
applying the four-factor test in Credit Suisse in the patent law context,
this Article finds that reverse-payment settlements fit perfectly into the
subcategory of patent activities that would not preempt antitrust law,

3342565, at *10 (E.D. Cal. July 2, 2014) (holding that Medicaid regulations regarding
managed care plans preempted the antitrust laws). But see In re Wellbutrin XL
Antitrust Litig., Nos. 08-2431 (direct), 08-2433 (indirect), 2012 WL 1657734, at *29–
30 (E.D. Pa. May 11, 2012) (rejecting the argument that FDA regulations had
preempted the antitrust laws in pharmaceutical conspiracy cases).
41. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
42. Id. at 2227.
43. Id. (quoting FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1289, 1312 (2012), rev’d,
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223.
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anyway.44 That is, on the merits, reverse-payment settlements—and,
likewise, the holding in Actavis—constitute one of a handful of built-in
exceptions to Credit Suisse rather than a negation of the rule. This
synchronicity suggests that a close re-examination of Credit Suisse and
its guiding principles may provide insight or predictive power as to
how the Court will strike a balance between the two spheres moving
forward: whether or not the Court explicitly invokes Credit Suisse or
preemption in such cases.45
With that payoff in mind, the next three Parts use Credit Suisse’s
four-factor test as a basic framework to engage with its analytical
structure on its own terms, thereby creating a taxonomy of patent
activities according to preemption potential. Specifically, Parts II and III
answer the questions posed by the first, second, and fourth prongs of the
Credit Suisse test: Where does regulatory authority exist in the patent
sphere and what kinds of activities does that authority supervise?46 Part
IV is devoted to answering the question posed by the third prong, which
occupied most of the Court’s attention in Credit Suisse: How severe is the
risk that overlapping patent and antitrust authority will lead to conflict?47
After engaging directly with the Court’s test, Part V broadens the analysis
by introducing additional arguments in favor of preemption for which
Credit Suisse and its doctrinal predecessors, such as NYNEX and Trinko,
appear to pave the way.
II. THE SOURCES OF PATENT REGULATORY AUTHORITY
The first two prongs of the Credit Suisse test ask whether regulatory
authority exists to “supervise the activities in question,” and whether
“the responsible regulatory entities” actually exercise their authority
in practice.48 The fourth prong asks the similar question of whether
the activities in question lie “squarely within an area” that the
preempting law “seeks to regulate.”49 Where regulatory authority
already exists and supervises conduct, the need for antitrust

44. See infra Section III.C.
45. In the alternative, if Actavis does signal a more fundamental regime change
moving forward, this Article provides an instrument to measure precisely how the
Court’s position shifts. In other words, whether the Court is becoming more
confident in antitrust law across contexts, becoming more skeptical of patent law
across contexts, or adjusting the balance only where the two genuinely overlap and
conflict may be determined by how the Court departs from the conclusions herein.
46. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 275–76 (2007).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 276.
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intervention is reduced and weighs in favor of preemption.50 This
Part offers broad answers to the initial questions posed by the first,
second, and fourth prongs, outlining the sources of regulatory
authority over patents and their general scope.
Of course, the Credit Suisse test is activity-specific,51 and the
argument that patent law features a sufficiently robust regulatory
apparatus to preempt antitrust law will not be equally persuasive for
all types of patent activity. This variation in patent regulatory
potential is explored in greater detail in Part III, which creates a
rough taxonomy of potentially anticompetitive patent activities and
the degree to which they are already under supervision. This Part
lays the groundwork for that analysis by first answering the
surprisingly complex question of where and in what form patent
regulatory authority exists at all.
Regulatory authority within the patent world stems primarily from
three remarkably different sources: (1) the Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO), (2) the International Trade Commission (ITC), and
(3) the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The PTO is an
agency only recently coming into its full strength, thanks to a
legislative overhaul. The ITC is an agency with considerable
longstanding authority but more limited policy levers. And the
Federal Circuit, using its unique position within the Article III
judiciary to act as a de facto agency, has filled much of the
unoccupied regulatory space between the two.52
A. The Patent and Trademark Office: An Agency on the Rise
Historically, the PTO has suffered from a surprising dearth of
administrative authority. Upon its creation, the Patent Office was
afforded seemingly broad powers:
[T]here shall be established . . . an office to be denominated the
Patent Office . . . whose duty it shall be . . . to superintend, execute,
and perform, all such acts and things touching and respecting the
granting and issuing of patents for new and useful discoveries,

50. Id.
51. See id. (acknowledging that the underwriters’ activities were “central to the
proper functioning of well-regulated capital markets”).
52. See infra notes 94–96 (explaining that the Federal Court Improvement Act
established the Federal Circuit to have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over
patent law cases).
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inventions, and improvements, as are herein provided for, or shall
hereafter be, by law, directed to be done and performed . . . .53

This authority was expanded in the Patent Act of 1952, which
granted the PTO the power to “prescribe regulations governing the
recognition and conduct of . . . parties before the Patent Office.”54
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit interpreted these grants narrowly,
rejecting the proposition that the PTO had the authority to receive
Chevron deference for any substantive, rather than merely procedural,
rules.55 This lack of deference led to the perception of the PTO as a
relatively “weak agency.”56
However, developments within the past five years have opened the
door to a much more robust and broad regulatory role for the PTO,
which the PTO has already begun to embrace. First and foremost, the
2011 passage of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA)57 has, in

53. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 1, 5 Stat. 117, 117–18. Prior to that point,
patent applications were examined by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War,
and the Attorney General. See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109–10.
54. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, §§ 6, 31, 66 Stat. 792, 793, 795
(codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2012)), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15, 28, 35, 42, and 51 U.S.C.).
55. In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme
Court held that when a federal agency charged with enforcing a statute interprets
ambiguous provisions within that statute, courts should apply a very high level of
deference to that interpretation. 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). The Federal Circuit has
generally held that this level of deference does not apply to the PTO’s substantive
interpretations of the patent laws. See, e.g., Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V. v. Cardiac
Sci. Operating Co., 590 F.3d 1326, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The PTO lacks substantive
rulemaking authority.”); Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (“[T]he broadest of the PTO’s rulemaking powers . . . does NOT grant the
Commissioner the authority to issue substantive rules.”); Animal Legal Def. Fund v.
Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 930 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“The authority granted [to the PTO] is
directed to the ‘conduct of proceedings’ before the Office. A substantive declaration
with regard to the Commissioner’s interpretation of the patent statutes . . . does not
fall within the usual interpretation of such statutory language.”).
56. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante
Foundations for Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1238–39 (2012) (recognizing
that prior to the passage of the AIA, the patent debate focused on Federal Circuit
decisions, not the PTO, which lacked any substantive rulemaking power); Samiyyah
R. Ali, Note, The Great Balancing Act: The Effect of the America Invents Act on the Division
of Power Between the Patent and Trademark Office and the Federal Circuit, 69 VAND. L. REV.
217, 222–23 (2016) (finding that the lack of both a congressional delegation and
Federal Circuit deference to the PTO created the perception of a “weak
administrative agency”).
57. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15, 28, 35, 42, and 51 U.S.C.).
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the eyes of then-Director of the PTO, David Kappos, provided “the
most significant overhaul to our patent system[] since the founding
fathers.”58 This overhaul includes new adjudicative, standard-setting,
and policymaking powers for the PTO.59 Next, even outside of the AIA
context, courts have begun to increasingly recognize that the PTO is
entitled to deference on substantive matters. These shifts signal a
significant increase in regulatory power for the PTO moving forward,
and they implicate Credit Suisse’s antitrust preemption analysis.
Turning first to the AIA, by granting the PTO increased control
through new adjudicative proceedings and a broadly-defined
prioritization power, the AIA “appears to vest the [PTO] with
substantive rulemaking authority.”60 In terms of new proceedings,
the AIA has created post-grant review61 and inter partes review,62
wherein third parties may challenge the validity of a recently issued
patent; derivation proceedings, wherein multiple parties contest
ownership of a single invention;63 and supplemental examinations,
wherein a patent owner may seek to correct errors made during
prosecution.64 These adjudicative proceedings are formal and “triallike”65—including pretrial discovery, witness testimony with crossexamination, rules of evidence, and oral arguments66—which weighs
considerably in favor of granting the PTO Chevron deference for
regulations or rulings resulting from these proceedings.67 Moreover,
58. David Kappos, Re-Inventing the US Patent System, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
(Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/re_inventing_the_us_patent.
59. 125 Stat. at 313, 329–33.
60. Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 609, 626 (2012).
61. See 35 U.S.C. § 321(b) (2012).
62. Id. § 311.
63. See id. §§ 135, 146, 291.
64. See id. § 257(a).
65. Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference
for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1983 (2013) (observing that the AIA’s
legislative history reveals Congress’s intent to establish a formal adjudication
process); see also Tran, supra note 60, at 631 (noting that the AIA “give[s] the USPTO
broad control over its new trial-like proceedings”).
66. See USPTO Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,761, 48,768 (Aug.
14, 2012).
67. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (“We have recognized
a very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment in express
congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication
that produces regulations or rulings . . . .”); see also Rai, supra note 56, at 1280 (“In
fact, the executive branch could also use the postgrant-review authority conferred
upon the PTO by the AIA to go one step further. As a doctrinal matter, under
current Supreme Court precedent, . . . the government could ask for Chevron
deference toward decisions made in postgrant review proceedings.”); Wasserman,
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the AIA explicitly grants the PTO rulemaking powers over these new
procedures—rulemaking that encompasses not only “procedures” but
also clearly substantive “standards.”68 By setting the standard for what
constitutes “derivation,” for example, the PTO can control “whether
some inventions are patentable” at all.69
On top of all of this, the AIA has created a new prioritization
power, granting the PTO the ability to fast-track inventions based
solely on policy considerations.70 By enabling the PTO to “set
standards that affect core patent rights” and rank the relative
importance of patent applications for policy reasons, the AIA has
defined the PTO’s role in shaping patent law and enhanced its role
beyond mere patent application review.71
Turning next to the courts, case law has begun to bolster the
general level of deference afforded to the PTO for interpretations of
patent laws. While the PTO still lacks Chevron deference for its

supra note 65, at 1989 (“[I]f a court determines that Congress intended the postgrant
review proceedings to be effectuated through formal adjudication, the PTO’s
interpretation of ambiguous terms of the Patent Act announced during postgrant
review proceedings should be entitled to Chevron deference.”). To wit, the Federal
Circuit has recognized Chevron deference for the ITC’s section 337 determinations
for exactly this reason. See, e.g., Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 796 F.3d 1338,
1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (noting that because the ITC’s “investigations under Section
337 require adequate notice, cross-examination, presentation of evidence, objection,
motion, argument, and all other rights” associated with a trial-like hearing, Chevron
deference applies). See generally infra text accompanying notes 83–85 (reviewing the
difference in levels of deference courts apply to the ITC’s section 337 interpretations
versus its Patent Act interpretations).
68. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 135(b) (granting the PTO authority to set forth
“standards” of “sufficient evidence to prove and rebut a claim of derivation”); id. §
316(a)(2) (granting the PTO authority to set forth “the standards for the showing of
sufficient grounds to institute” inter partes review); id. § 362(a)(2) (granting the
PTO authority to set forth “the standards for the showing of sufficient grounds to
institute” post-grant review); id. § 316(a)(5) (granting the PTO authority to set forth
the “standards” for “necessary . . . discovery”); id. § 316(a)(9) (granting the PTO
authority to set forth “standards” for when amending a patent is proper). Courts
generally recognize “standard-setting” as a form of substantive rulemaking. See, e.g.,
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472–77 (2001); JEM Broad. Co. v.
FCC, 22 F.3d 320, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
69. Tran, supra note 60, at 644.
70. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(G) (“[The PTO] may, subject to any conditions
prescribed by the Director and at the request of the patent applicant, provide for
prioritization of examination of applications for products, processes, or technologies
that are important to the national economy or national competitiveness . . . .”).
71. Tran, supra note 60, at 640.
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interpretations of the Patent Act,72 its entitlement to the lesser
The
Skidmore deference73 has become increasingly accepted.74
difference between the two may be more academic than practical; a
comprehensive empirical study by Professors Kristin Hickman and
Matthew Kreuger found that federal courts of appeals applying
Skidmore are “highly deferential,” with outcomes “weighted heavily in
favor of government agencies.”75 Even where courts have not
explicitly invoked a standard of deference, core PTO interpretations
have been gaining traction, causing “substantial legal effect” and, in
some cases, being adopted wholesale.76

72. In Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, the Supreme Court did extend
Chevron deference to the PTO’s interpretations of certain statutes relating to inter
partes review. 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016); see, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012)
(making “final and nonappealable” the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s (PTAB)
decision to institute an IPR petition). However, the PTO’s interpretations of
statutory patentability requirements—i.e., 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103—still do not receive
such deference.
73. In Skidmore v. Swift & Co., the Supreme Court held that even when an
agency’s rulings and interpretations lack the authority to control in the courts,
certain agency judgments—those that demonstrate thorough consideration, valid
reasoning, and consistency with previous pronouncements—may have the “power to
persuade.” 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). This has generally been considered a basis for
agency deference independent from (and “weaker” to) Chevron deference. See, e.g.,
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006); see also Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference:
Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the Architecture of Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1105, 1125–27 (2001).
74. See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
689 F.3d 1303, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[W]e owe deference [to the PTO] only
commensurate with ‘the thoroughness of its consideration and the validity of its
reasoning.’” (quoting Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996))),
aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Univ. of Mass. v. Kappos, 903 F. Supp. 2d 77,
84 (D.D.C. 2012)(“[T]he PTO’s determination is not entitled to Chevron deference
[but is] entitled to deference under Skidmore.”). But see Photocure ASA v. Kappos,
603 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (denying the PTO Skidmore deference for its
interpretation of patent-term extensions because of previously inconsistent
interpretations by the PTO).
75. Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore
Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1280 (2007) (emphasis added); see also William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of
Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1099
(2008) (finding that agency win rates under Chevron and Skidmore standards from
1983 to 2005 were 76.2% and 73.5%, respectively).
76. John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEX. L.
REV. 1041, 1110 (2011) (highlighting the acceptance and adoption of the PTO’s
utility and written-description guidelines into Federal Circuit case law); Rai, supra
note 56, at 1255 (same). For examples of this adoption, see Ariad Pharmaceuticals,
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In short, the AIA expanded the PTO’s substantive rulemaking
power considerably, and—even where it failed to do so—the PTO has
already “demonstrated an ability to use rulemaking” to “steer
substantive patent law’s development in important ways.”77
Combined, these increases in authorized and utilized regulatory
control support a narrowing role for antitrust law in the patent world
under the preemption analysis of Credit Suisse.
B. The International Trade Commission: Longstanding Regulatory
Authority
In comparison to the relatively weak historical power of the PTO,
the ITC has long wielded considerable administrative power. Under
section 337 of the Tariff Act,78 the ITC has the authority to investigate
and rule on “[u]nfair methods of competition,” including “[t]he
importation into the United States . . . of articles that . . . infringe a
valid and enforceable United States patent.”79 In terms of remedies,
the ITC has a relatively unique form of injunctive relief at its disposal:
the exclusion order.80 These orders block importation of the

Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1347, 1352–53 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“If the law of
written description is to be changed, contrary to sound policy and the uniform
holdings of this court . . . and PTO practice, such a decision would require good
reason and would rest with Congress.”); In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1372, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (finding the PTO’s utility standards to be consistent with the court’s
understanding of the statutory requirement); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323
F.3d 956, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (adopting the PTO’s standard for evaluating
compliance with written description requirements).
77. John M. Golden, The USPTO’s Soft Power: Who Needs Chevron Deference?, 66
SMU L. REV. 541, 551 (2013).
78. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 703 (1930) (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. § 1337).
79. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012).
80. § 1337(d)(2); see, e.g., Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 386 F.3d
1095, 1108 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In practice, once infringement is found, an exclusion
order is almost always granted. See Sapna Kumar, Expert Court, Expert Agency, 44 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 1557 n.45 (2011) (“There have only been three cases since 1974
where the ITC has found an imported good to infringe a valid patent, but declined
to issue an exclusion order . . . .”). This is in large part because the ITC’s exclusion
power is granted by statute rather than traditional principles of equity such that the
typical (and difficult to satisfy) four-part test for a permanent injunction is not used.
See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (noting that a plaintiff
seeking a permanent injunction in equity must show: “(1) that it has suffered an
irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and
(4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction”).
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infringing product, including downstream-implementing products.81
Along similar lines, the ITC may issue cease and desist orders to
direct a company within the United States to “cease its unfair acts,
including selling infringing imported articles out of U.S. inventory.”82
The courts have already determined that the ITC receives Chevron
deference in interpreting section 337.83 This allows the ITC
considerable power over not only its own internal procedures but also
in setting standards for what constitutes, for example, “[u]nfair
methods of competition . . . in the importation of articles.”84 Such an
interpretation might reasonably include certain patent activity short
of or distinct from infringement that nevertheless implicates
competitive equilibria.
While the overwhelming majority of section 337 actions require
adjudicating claims of patent infringement—and, therefore, defenses
to infringement85—the ITC does not currently receive Chevron
deference for its interpretations of the Patent Act itself.86 Moving
forward, however, that deference may emerge indirectly. The
language “valid and enforceable United States patent” is used in
section 337, but neither “valid” nor “enforceable” is defined
elsewhere in the statute.87 “Valid” is used in varying contexts
throughout the Tariff Act,88 and “enforceable” has “no common

81. See, e.g., Hyundai Elecs. Indus. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 899 F.2d 1204,
1209–10 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (affirming the ITC’s issuance of a limited exclusion order
against downstream devices that contained infringing memory devices), aff’d in part,
vacated in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Int’l Trade Comm’n v. Intel Corp., 946 F.2d 821
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
82. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS: ANSWERS TO
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 24 (2009), https://www.usitc.gov/intellectual_propert
y/documents/337_faqs.pdf.
83. See ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 810 F.3d 1283, 1290
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (granting Chevron deference to the ITC’s interpretations of section 337
by acknowledging that the ITC has authority to resolve the ambiguity in section 337).
84. § 1337(a)(1)(A).
85. See, e.g., Kumar, supra note 80, at 1554 n.27 (“In the 2009 fiscal year, for
example, seventy-nine of the eighty-five active section 337 investigations included a
patent infringement claim.”).
86. Id. at 1562. Nor does the ITC appear to receive such deference implicitly.
See David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim Construction
Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the International Trade
Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699, 1719–20 (2009) (“The reversal rates for the
ITC appear roughly in line with the reversal rates for patent-busy district courts.”).
87. § 1337(a).
88. See, e.g., § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i), (a)(1)(C) (using the term “valid” in reference to
patents, copyrights, and trademarks interchangeably).
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definition” in patent law.89 Unlike the sections of the Tariff Act
governing copyright and trademark issues—which directly reference
both the Copyright and Trademark Acts90—the Tariff Act does not
directly reference the Patent Act. This ambiguity in the text—and
lack of tethering to the Patent Act, which the ITC does not
administer91—opens the door for Chevron deference to the ITC’s
determinations of what constitutes patent validity and enforceability
in its formal section 337 adjudications.92
The longstanding administrative authority and deference afforded
to the ITC, in addition to its potential for deference on matters of
patent validity and enforceability, suggests minimizing the role for
antitrust law where patents are involved under the Credit Suisse
framework. This is bolstered further by the PTO’s more direct
administrative role over the Patent Act, including its recently
enhanced regulatory powers and authority.93 A third key player in
the patent realm, the Federal Circuit, makes the need for outside
interference of antitrust law even more suspect.
C. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Court as Agency
The Federal Circuit is the odd duck of Article III courts. It is the
only federal court of appeals with jurisdiction solely defined by
subject matter rather than geography.94 Moreover, it is unique in that
it exercises near-exclusive dominion over its subject matter; most
cases that end up before the Federal Circuit could not have properly
ended up before any other intermediate court of appeals.95 Similarly,
89. Kumar, supra note 80, at 1577 (“Although the Federal Circuit has found a
patent to be unenforceable in certain circumstances, such as in cases of inequitable
conduct, there is no common definition for the term.” (footnote omitted)).
90. See § 1337 (a)(1)(B)(i) (“[C]opyright registered under title 17 . . . .”); § 1337
(a)(1)(C) (“[T]rademark registered under the Trademark Act of 1946 . . . .”).
91. Corning Glass Works v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 799 F.2d 1559, 1565 n.5 (Fed.
Cir. 1986) (“[T]he [ITC] is not charged with administration of the patent
statute . . . .”).
92. Kumar, supra note 80, at 1568–75. As noted supra note 67, under Mead,
where an agency engages in formal adjudication, interpretations of the statute that
the agency “administers” are afforded Chevron deference. United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–30 (2001). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero,
92 VA. L. REV. 187, 190–91 (2006).
93. See supra text accompanying note 77.
94. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012) (defining the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction
in terms of subject matter), with 28 U.S.C. § 41 (defining the regional circuits’
geographic jurisdictions).
95. § 1295(a) (detailing the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction); see also Hon.
Diane P. Wood, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Keynote
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it is the only federal court of appeals other than the Supreme Court
with national jurisdiction, taking appeals from all ninety-four federal
district courts.96 This idiosyncratic position that the Federal Circuit
occupies—national and exclusive control of, among other things,
patent appeals—has enabled it to perform a likewise idiosyncratic
role: court as agency. By engaging in quasi-agency functions, the
Federal Circuit further contributes to the preemption of antitrust law
under the analysis of Credit Suisse.
These quirks of the Federal Circuit are a feature, not a bug; unlike
the regional circuits, the Federal Circuit was the product of specific,
articulated policy goals. In the late 1970s, a presidential policy review
concluded that “disuniform patent law” had become an “impediment
to continued American dominance of the technology industry.”97
That disuniformity spurred “widespread” patent forum shopping as
litigants vied to have their cases heard in circuits considered
significantly more or less friendly to patent rights.98 Meanwhile, the
federal courts of appeals were faced with “exploding caseloads,”99 a
burden that nearly quadrupled from 1960 to 1973.100 Professor
Daniel Meador envisioned a singular solution to these twin problems:

Address at the Chicago-Kent Supreme Court IP Review: Is It Time to Abolish the
Federal Circuit’s Exclusive Jurisdiction in Patent Cases? (Sept. 26, 2013), in 13 CHI.KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 1 (2013), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewco
ntent.cgi?article=11396&context=journal_articles (stating that the Federal Circuit
has “exclusive jurisdiction over three types of appeals in patent cases: (1) appeals
from district courts in cases ‘arising under’ the patent; (2) appeals from decisions of
the [PTO’s] Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences; and (3) appeals from
investigations of the [ITC] into the importation of goods that allegedly infringe a
U.S. patent”). But see Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808–
09 (1988) (holding that cases involving only patent law defenses do not fall under the
Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction).
96. Elizabeth I. Winston, Differentiating the Federal Circuit, 76 MO. L. REV. 813, 815–
18 (2011).
97. Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437,
1454 (2012) (citing COMM’N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS.,
STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, 67 F.R.D.
195, 369–71 (1975)).
98. COMM’N ON REVISION, supra note 97, at 220; see also J. Jonas Anderson, Court
Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 631, 647 (2015) (“Patent holders
tended to prefer to file their cases in a district court within the Fifth, Sixth, or
Seventh Circuit . . . . Defendants usually preferred to litigate in the Eighth or Ninth
Circuit . . . .”).
99. Gugliuzza, supra note 97, at 1454–55.
100. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 72–73
tbl.3.6 (1996).
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the creation of a national patent appeals court.101 His vision and
efforts as head of the Office for Improvements in the Administration
of Justice102 would eventually lead to the Federal Courts Improvement
Act of 1982 (“FCIA”),103 creating the Federal Circuit:
Directing patent appeals to the new court will have the beneficial
effect of removing these unusually complex, technically difficult,
and time-consuming cases from the dockets of the regional courts
of appeals. . . . [T]he central purpose is to reduce the widespread
lack of uniformity and uncertainty of legal doctrine that exist in the
administration of patent law.104

In practice, the Federal Circuit has taken the intention of its
creation—uniformity and expertise in patent law—as well as its
unique position in the judiciary, and translated it into two key
practices that resemble those of an agency: rulemaking and nondeferential review. First, in terms of rulemaking, the Federal Circuit
has behaved similar to an agency by issuing mandatory, bright-line
rules via case law. The early history of the Federal Circuit in particular
is replete with examples of such bright-line rules. The presumption of
entitlement to injunctive relief for infringement105 and the mandatory
“teaching, suggestion, or motivation” test for obviousness106 offer two
familiar examples. While the Supreme Court strongly encouraged this
quasi-agency rulemaking role early on,107 that trend has changed in
101. Gugliuzza, supra note 97, at 1455.
102. Daniel J. Meador, Origin of the Federal Circuit: A Personal Account, 41 AM. U. L.
REV. 581, 582 & nn.4–7 (1992).
103. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25; see,
e.g., 127 CONG. REC. 27,792 (1981) (statement of Rep. McClory) (“[W]e heard a great
deal of testimony concerning the problem of forum-shopping which presently is
practiced in many different district courts around the country.”).
104. H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 22–23 (1981) (reporting on the FCIA).
105. See Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(asserting that “[a] court should not be reluctant to use its equity powers,” and
deciding “that where validity and continuing infringement have been clearly
established . . . immediate irreparable harm is presumed”), abrogated by Robert Bosch
LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
106. See ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (citing In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048 (C.C.P.A. 1976))(“Obviousness cannot be
established by combining the teachings of the prior art to produce the claimed
invention, absent some teaching or suggestion supporting the combination. Under
section 103, teachings or references can be combined only if there is some suggestion
or incentive to do so.”).
107. See, e.g., Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67–68 (1998); Isabelle R.
McAndrews, The On-Sale Bar After Pfaff v. Wells Electronics: Toward a Bright-Line Rule,
81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 155, 160 (1999) (“The U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari [in Pfaff] to develop a ‘bright-line rule’ regarding what type of
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recent years.108 Despite this pushback, the Federal Circuit retains
considerable rulemaking potential,109 whether through “process-based
formalism”110 or the mechanism of en banc review:
The number and breadth of questions the Federal Circuit agrees to
hear en banc and the means by which it hears them go beyond the
limited role of a court—to decide the case before it. Instead of
exercising restraint and addressing only what it must, the Federal
Circuit raises wide-ranging questions and makes broad
pronouncements of law that set or change patent policy.
. . . Despite being an appellate court not subject to the notice
and comment requirements [of administrative agencies], the
Federal Circuit appears to comply with these requirements when it
orders cases to be heard en banc.111

Second, the Federal Circuit has engaged in non-deferential,
agency-like review of PTO and ITC cases. The low standards of
review afforded the PTO and ITC closely resemble “the non-deferential
approach taken by the top level of an agency reviewing an administrative
law judge more than a federal court reviewing an executive branch
agency.”112 This stands in stark contrast to the Federal Circuit’s
treatment of non-patent agencies, which typically receive considerable
deference.113 By offering very limited deference to the patent agencies

commercial activity would constitute placing an invention ‘on sale’ under 35 U.S.C.
102(b).”).
108. See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415, 427 (2007)
(characterizing the Federal Circuit’s “Teaching, Suggestion, Motivation” rule as “too
constrained to serve its purpose”); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 394
(2006) (criticizing the Federal Circuit’s “general rule . . . [of] issu[ing] permanent
injunctions against patent infringement”); Sapna Kumar, The Accidental Agency?, 65 FLA.
L. REV. 229, 253 (2013) (summarizing Supreme Court case law demonstrating a
backlash against the Federal Circuit’s “rigid reliance” on obligatory tests).
109. See, e.g., Kumar, supra note 108, at 253 (“The Court has not expressed
concern over the Federal Circuit’s creating tests to help clarify ambiguities in the
Patent Act . . . .” (emphasis added)).
110. Timothy R. Holbrook, Substantive Versus Process-Based Formalism in Claim
Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 123, 126–27, 129 (2005). Analyzing the Federal
Circuit’s jurisprudence, Professor Holbrook contrasts “[s]ubstantively formalistic rules,”
which the Supreme Court is more likely to limit, with “procedurally formalistic” rules,
which the Supreme Court has generally upheld. Id. at 125–26 (emphasis added).
111. Ryan Vacca, Acting like an Administrative Agency: The Federal Circuit En Banc, 76
MO. L. REV. 733, 733–34 (2011) (footnotes omitted).
112. Kumar, supra note 108, at 258; see also Tran, supra note 60, at 616 (“[The
Federal Circuit] has assumed exclusive responsibility for making substantive
interpretations of the Patent Act . . . .”).
113. See, e.g., Keener v. United States, 551 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(granting Chevron deference to the Treasury’s interpretation of the Internal Revenue
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below, the Federal Circuit has thus entered a policymaking space,
effectively treating the PTO and ITC as the court’s alter ego.
Much like the Federal Circuit’s practice of creating bright-line
rules, its lack of deference to the PTO and ITC has received some
pushback, as noted in Sections II.A and II.B. But even if these critiques of
the Federal Circuit as a quasi-agency win out, with an aggressive tamping
down on rulemaking or non-deferential review, the PTO and ITC’s
regulatory authority would almost certainly grow to fill the void.114
In other words, future changes to the patent regulatory apparatus
are likely to be hydraulic shifts in authority between the PTO, ITC,
and Federal Circuit, if not outright expansions. And the aggregate
amount of regulatory authority afforded these three entities is already
quite significant in scope and scale. Taken together, the authority
ought to be enough to implicate Credit Suisse’s preemption test in at
least some types of cases.115 The following Part takes up the task of
determining precisely which types.
Code); Patterson v. Dep’t of the Interior, 424 F.3d 1151, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(granting Chevron deference to the Office of Personnel Management); Tunik v. Merit
Sys. Prot. Bd., 407 F.3d 1326, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (granting Chevron deference to
the Merit Systems Protection Board); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell Document
Mgmt. Prods. Co., 994 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (interpreting the Lanham
Act to warrant Chevron deference for the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board).
114. Indeed, as some scholars have observed, the Federal Circuit’s longstanding
agency-like intervention can be traced to Congress’s failure to instill sufficiently
broad and deep regulatory authority in the PTO and ITC to begin with. In other
words, a robust regulatory structure governing patents is so fundamentally necessary
as to essentially be inevitable. See, e.g., Jonas Anderson, Congress as a Catalyst of Patent
Reform at the Federal Circuit, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 961, 963, 965–66 (2014) (suggesting that
the Federal Circuit has constantly expanded its influence in patents in spite of the
growth of, among others, the PTO, and suggesting Congress as the best tool to check
that Federal Circuit’s expansion); Kumar, supra note 108, at 275–78 (“[T]he Federal
Circuit filled a void left by Congress when it failed to grant the PTO full substantive
rulemaking authority, and the Federal Circuit brought greater clarity and
predictability to patent law.”); Vacca, supra note 111, at 758 (“By drafting a broadlyworded Patent Act, [Congress] delegated its duty to set rules and policies. By not
giving the PTO authority to promulgate substantive rules . . . , Congress left it to the
courts to flesh out rules and direct patent policy. . . . [T]he only institution that
could handle the task was the Federal Circuit.”).
115. To be sure, some scholars have touted the non-regulatory nature of antitrust
law as a virtue, rendering the adjudicative process largely immune to interest-group
“capture.” See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory
Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685, 698–70 (2009). To the extent that patent regulation as
discussed in this article stems in large part from the judiciary, however, concerns
about preemption leading to increased capture should be mitigated. See id. at 699
(“Judges, by contrast, are much less subject to having their purpose diverted or to
being captured.”).
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III. THE EXTENT OF PATENT SUPERVISION
Having outlined the sources of regulatory authority over patents
and their general scope, the question posed by Credit Suisse’s four-part
test may be properly answered: over what kinds of activities is patent
“regulatory authority” existing and exercised?116 This Part creates a
rough hierarchy of potentially anticompetitive patent activities and
analyzes the degree to which they are already squarely under
supervision from patent authorities.
To be clear, this Article does not argue that where patent
regulatory authority supervises an activity, it will necessarily reach the
same end results as antitrust law. The Credit Suisse Court found it
sufficient that the SEC had the legal authority to “supervise the
activities in question”—and that the SEC actually “exercised” that
authority—for the analysis to weigh in favor of preemption.117 The
Court was not concerned with whether the outcome of that supervision
matched the outcome that applying antitrust scrutiny would
provide.118 On the contrary, it was the “risk that the securities and
antitrust laws, if both applicable, would produce conflicting” outcomes
in terms of “guidance . . . or standards of conduct” that further
supported the case for preemption.119 The risk that simultaneous
application of patent and antitrust laws will similarly produce
conflicting guidance is analyzed in greater detail in Part IV.
The argument for preemption is at its strongest across two
categories of activity: (1) attempts to expand the scope of a patent
through licensing arrangements implicating other products or
intellectual property and (2) attempts to exploit information
asymmetry within the patent system. As explained below, these two
categories are already supervised through patent misuse doctrine,
recordation requirements, and equitable estoppel doctrine. The
argument for preemption is somewhat weaker with respect to the
next category of activity: (3) attempts to control downstream use and
sale of patented products.120 Patent exhaustion doctrine offers

116. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 275 (2007).
117. Id. at 275–77.
118. Id. at 282–85.
119. Id. at 275–76 (emphasis added).
120. “Patented products” (or “patented goods”) is used throughout the remainder
of this Article as shorthand for products that are either themselves patented (for
example, a “machine” or “composition of matter”) or designed to practice a
patented “method.” 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (establishing categories of patentable
subject matter). See generally U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., MANUAL OF PATENT
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limited supervision of this category such that some antitrust
intervention may be warranted. The argument for preemption is at
its weakest across the final two categories of activity: (4) collusion
with competitors through patent pooling or cross-licensing and (5)
mergers with competitors through patent acquisition or transfer.
There is little to no alternative supervision of these activities, and
antitrust law brings considerable expertise and specialization to bear
on these types of cases. In table form:
Category of Activity
(1) Licensing arrangements
implicating other products/intellectual
property
(2) Attempts to exploit information
asymmetry
(3) Attempts to control downstream
use/sale of patented products
(4) Colluding with competitors
through patent polling/cross-licensing
(5) Merging with competitors through
patent acquisition/transfer

Level of Preemption
Full preemption: minimal need for
antitrust intervention
Quasi-preemption: some need for
antitrust intervention
No preemption: full need for antitrust
intervention

Of course, some potentially anticompetitive patent activities may
not fit neatly into the taxonomy above. But these categories should at
least provide a useful rubric against which courts and policymakers
considering potential antitrust intervention may judge other patent
activities.
Patent activities comparable to those in the latter
categories may require at least partial application of the antitrust
laws; patent activities comparable to those in the higher categories
are likely supervised by patent law to such an extent that Credit Suisse
analysis would endorse preemption.
A. Full Preemption
The Credit Suisse arguments in favor of preemption are at their
strongest across two general categories of potentially anticompetitive
patent activities. The first category is attempts to expand the scope of a
patent by using licensing arrangements that implicate other products
or intellectual property. The second category is attempts to exploit
information asymmetry caused by opacity in the patent system. These
categories encompass patent activities that are already supervised by

EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2106 (9th ed. Rev. 7, Nov. 2015) (explaining the
distinctions between the categories in detail).
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patent authority to such an extent that the need for antitrust
intervention is minimal. Permitting antitrust law and patent law to
overlap in these contexts would therefore do more harm than good
and would generate conflicting guidance and standards of conduct.121
1.

Attempts to expand the scope of a patent
A patentee may attempt to expand the scope of their patent
through licensing arrangements that implicate other products or
intellectual property. For example, as a condition of licensing a
patent, a licensor may require a prospective licensee to also purchase
licenses on their other patents (“package licensing”),122 or assign back
any subsequent patents, such as improvements that the licensee
creates (“grantbacks”).123 A licensor may require licensees to
continue paying royalties for some period beyond the expiration of
the patent or peg the royalties that licensees pay to products
completely unrelated to the licensed patent.124
What these scenarios have in common is that they feature patent
owners using their patents as leverage, extending the limited scope of
their grant of monopoly power to include other goods or intellectual
property via licensing arrangements. In other words, they are
attempts to broaden the physical or temporal scope of the patent.
Noting the potential for this activity to disrupt the marketplace and
reduce incentives to innovate, many scholars,125 practitioners,126 and
121. See infra Part IV.
122. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND
COMPETITION
103–07
(2007)
[hereinafter
PROMOTING
INNOVATION],
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/222655.pdf;
Peter Lee, The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1413 (2016);
William D. Coston, The Patent-Antitrust Interface: Are There Any No-No’s Today?,
VENABLE LLP (2013), https://www.venable.com/the-patent-antitrust-interface--arethere-any-no-nos-today/; Howard Ullman, A Modern Look at the 9 Patent Licensing ‘NoNos’, ORRICK (2013), https://www.orrick.com/Insights/2013/02/A-Modern-Look-AtThe-9-Patent-Licensing-NoNos.
123. See, e.g., PROMOTING INNOVATION, supra note 122, at 90–93; Coston, supra note
122; Ullman, supra note 122.
124. See, e.g., PROMOTING INNOVATION, supra note 122, at 115–19; Coston, supra
note 122; Ullman, supra note 122.
125. For examples of academics supporting antitrust intervention in the context
of package licensing, see generally Michael A. Carrier, Patent Assertion Entities: Six
Actions the Antitrust Agencies Can Take, 1 CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Winter 2013, at 1, 2–
3, 10–11; Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Movement of Technology, 19 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 1119, 1120–21 (2012). For examples of academics supporting
antitrust intervention in the context of patent grantbacks, see Robin Feldman, The
Open Source Biotechnology Movement: Is It Patent Misuse?, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 117,
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policymakers127 have proposed antitrust interventions. However, the
Credit Suisse Court would recognize that regulatory authority within
the patent world already exists to supervise this activity in the form of
patent misuse doctrine.
Patent misuse is an equitable defense to infringement based on the
principle of unclean hands.128 This principle is “intended to prevent
a patent-holder from extending the power of a patent beyond the
scope of the patent itself.”129 When an alleged infringer raises the
defense of patent misuse, the key question becomes whether “the
patentee . . . ‘impermissibly broadened the “physical or temporal
scope” of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect.’”130 If so, the
patent becomes “unenforceable until the misuse is purged.”131
Each of the potentially anticompetitive activities listed above—
package licensing, grantbacks, and royalty manipulation—have been
examined through the lens of patent misuse.132 The misuse doctrine is a

153–58 (2004); Willard K. Tom & Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual
Property: From Separate Spheres to Unified Field, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 167, 197 (1997). For
examples of academics supporting antitrust intervention for anticompetitive royalty
schemes, see Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago
in Support of Neither Party at 6–9, Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401,
2015 WL 1048416 (2015) (No. 13-720); Leslie Ware & Jaden Warren, Rule of Reason
for Post-Expiration Patent Royalties, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 37, 40–42 (2016).
126. See, e.g., Alden F. Abbott, Abuse of Dominance by Patentees: A Pro-Innovation
Perspective, ANTITRUST SOURCE 6–11 (Oct. 2014), http://www.americanbar.org/conten
t/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/oct14_abbott_10_21f.authcheckdam.pdf
(advocating for antitrust intervention where patent owners exceed “the legitimate
scope of a patent right”); Coston, supra note 122; Intellectual Property & Antitrust
Issues:
Licensing Restrictions, PATENTBARISTAS (Sept. 9, 2011, 11:01 AM),
http://www.patentbaristas.com/archives/2011/09/09/intellectual-propertyantitrust-issues-licensing-restrictions/ (arguing that where package licensing and
grantbacks are concerned, patent law and antitrust law must work in tandem, not
separately); Ullman, supra note 122.
127. See, e.g., PROMOTING INNOVATION, supra note 122, at 103–14 (arguing that
antitrust law should play a significant role in policing package licensing, grantbacks,
and potentially anticompetitive royalty schemes).
128. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The
defense of patent misuse arises from the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, and
relates generally to the use of patent rights to obtain or to coerce an unfair
commercial advantage.”).
129. Geoffrey D. Oliver, Princo v. International Trade Commission: Antitrust Law
and the Patent Misuse Doctrine Part Company, 25 ANTITRUST, Spring 2011, at 62, 62.
130. B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(quoting Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
131. Id. at 1427.
132. See, e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2406 (2015)
(upholding the misuse analysis in Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964)); Brulotte,
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natural fit to supervising these activities, tasked as it is with finding the
boundary between the inherently anticompetitive effects of patent grant
and enforcement133 and the anticompetitive effects of patentee
overreach.134 While not all of these activities have been found to
constitute patent misuse in all cases, the doctrine of patent misuse is, at a
minimum, applicable to the activities. Because these activities rely on the
power to demand licenses, when patent misuse is found—and the patent
hence becomes unenforceable—the patentee loses the power to
continue their scheme. As a result, these activities are already supervised
through patent law; antitrust intervention is, in a sense, duplicative.
Moreover, this supervision is regulatory in nature: the ITC and the
Federal Circuit exercise significant authority over what constitutes
patent misuse. Misuse is a defense under the Tariff Act,135 so that the
regulatory authority the ITC exercises over matters of patent validity
and enforceability136 would include determining the proper scope of
misuse. Similarly, because the Federal Circuit exercises exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over infringement cases,137 defenses to
infringement, such as misuse, would be included in its de facto
rulemaking authority.138 Between the ITC and the Federal Circuit,
then, it appears that patent misuse offers the legal authority to
oversee activities such as package licensing, grantbacks, and royalty
manipulation.139 The existence of this authority and its pattern of
usage thus weighs in favor of preemption under Credit Suisse’s
analysis.140

379 U.S. at 30 (examining post-expiration royalties as potential patent misuse);
Powertech Tech., Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., 660 F.3d 1301, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (examining
royalty payments pegged to sales of unrelated products as potential patent misuse);
U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 424 F.3d 1179, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(examining package licensing as potential patent misuse); Duplan Corp. v. Deering
Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648, 757 (D.S.C. 1977) (examining grantbacks as potential
patent misuse), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 594 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1979). See generally
Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 475, 476 (2011)
(discussing judicial application of misuse to package licensing and grantbacks).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 1–3.
134. See Oliver, supra note 129, at 63.
135. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (2012) (“[E]quitable defenses may be presented in all
cases.”); see also Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1345–46 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (en banc) (Dyk, J., dissenting) (discussing the ITC’s rejection of a misuse claim).
136. See supra Section II.B (discussing the ITC’s regulatory authority).
137. See supra notes 94–96.
138. See supra Section II.C (discussing the Federal Circuit’s quasi-agency functions).
139. See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 275 (2007).
140. Id. at 277.
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2.

Attempts to exploit information asymmetry
A patentee may also attempt to exploit information asymmetry
caused by opacity in the patent system. For example, standard-setting
organizations (“SSOs”) are voluntary industry groups that exist to
develop and promote industry standards to improve interoperability
of their products—such as the 3G standard that many cell phone
manufacturers have adopted, allowing their different phones to all
communicate with any 3G-conforming cell towers.141 In the process
of weighing the costs and benefits of using different technologies in
their standard, SSOs will ask members to disclose any relevant patents
the members may have.142 Those with relevant patents may be asked
to agree to certain royalty arrangements, such as royalty caps, in
exchange for their inclusion in the standard.143 But a member might
instead conceal its relevant patents, wait until the SSO has unwittingly
adopted an infringing standard—“and investments have been made
to commit to the new technology”—and then demand exorbitant
royalties, a practice known as “hold-up.”144
For another example, retributional and reputational concerns
typically act to constrain patentees’ enforcement activity. In terms of
retribution, rival companies likely “each possess patents that
implicate one another’s products,” so “they enter into cross licenses
141. See, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 304 (3d Cir. 2007)
(addressing the 3G standard created by an SSO and the competing standards). See
generally Kai-Uwe Kühn et al., Standard Setting Organizations Can Help Solve the Standard
Essential Patents Licensing Problem, 3 CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Winter 2013, at 1, 2; Anne
Layne-Farrar et al., Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard-Setting Organizations:
Making Sense of FRAND Commitments, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 671 (2007).
142. See, e.g., Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 141, at 672.
143. Frequently, SSOs will ask patent owners to agree to license their relevant
patents on so-called “FRAND” terms: licensing terms that are fair, reasonable, and
non-discriminatory. See Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 141, at 671–72; Koren W.
Wong-Ervin, Methodologies for Calculating FRAND Royalty Rates and Damages, FTC (Oct.
22, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/key-speeches-presentations
/wong-ervin_aba_program_frand_royalty_rates_10-22-14.pdf. This practice, and the
tension it has created, is discussed in greater detail infra Part V.
144. See Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 7, at 470; Jorge L. Contreras, Equity,
Antitrust, and the Reemergence of the Patent Unenforceability Remedy, ANTITRUST SOURCE 2
(Oct. 2011), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_
source/oct11_contreras_10_24f.authcheckdam.pdf (“[B]efore a standard is lockedin, the industry may choose among various technical alternatives: some may be
covered by patents and others may not. Patented technology must compete with
unpatented technology on the basis of factors including price and technical quality.
After lock-in, however, the cost of switching to a new standard increases dramatically,
and patent holders who emerge without warning have significant, and arguably
improper, leverage to charge rents to implementers of the standard.”).
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or (similarly) abstain from suing one another . . . [in] the patent
In terms of
equivalent of . . . mutual assured destruction.”145
reputation, patentees may face “customers exerting pressure to settle
litigation or shareholders skeptical of patent enforcement.”146 Where
patentees hope to engage with SSOs, “a reputation as a non-aggressor
can increase the likelihood that a firm’s technology is included in
standards.”147 But by transferring their patents to a shell subsidiary or
third party who engages in litigation on their behalf, patentees may
avoid those concerns by obfuscating their link to the patent or the
litigation, a maneuver known as “privateering.”148
What these scenarios have in common is that they feature patent
owners exploiting information asymmetry, using opacity in patent
ownership to gain leverage and even raise the operating costs of their
competitors. Noting the anticompetitive potential of these activities,
many scholars,149 practitioners,150 and policymakers151 have proposed

145. See Mark S. Popofsky & Michael D. Laufert, Patent Assertion Entities and
Antitrust: Operating Company Patent Transfers, ANTITRUST SOURCE 4 (Apr. 2013),
https://www.ropesgray.com/~/media/Files/articles/2013/04/Antitrust-Attacks-onPatent-Assertion-Entities.pdf (explaining the deterrence effects of defensive
patenting).
146. Carrier, supra note 125, at 7.
147. Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 145, at 4.
148. See, e.g., Sipe, supra note 8, at 192–94, 199; Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, FTC,
Opening Remarks at the Computer & Communications Industry Association and
American Antitrust Institute Program, Competition Law & Patent Assertion Entities:
What Antitrust Enforcers Can Do 7 (June 20, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/defa
ult/files/documents/public_statements/competition-law-patent-assertion-entitieswhat-antitrust-enforcers-can-do/130620paespeech.pdf (stating that privateering,
through “a lack of transparency,” enables assertion without “mutually assured
destruction by proxy”).
149. For examples of academics supporting antitrust intervention in the context
of holdup, see Joseph Farrell et al., Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-up, 74
ANTITRUST L.J. 603 (2007); J. Gregory Sidak, Patent Holdup and Oligopsonistic Collusion
in Standard-Setting Organizations, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 123 (2009); Robert A.
Skitol, Concerted Buyer Power: Its Potential for Addressing the Patent Holdup Problem in
Standard Setting, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 727 (2005). For examples of academics
supporting antitrust intervention in the context of privateering, see Carrier, supra
note 125, at 2; Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 145; Comments of the American
Antitrust Institute to the Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice
on Patent Assertion Entities (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/wor
kshops/pae/comments/paew-0011.pdf; Comments of Phillip Malone, Harvard Law
School, Patent Assertion Entities Activities Workshop 155–56 (Dec. 10, 2012),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/Patent%20Assert
ion%20Entity%20Activities%20Workshop%20/pae_transcript.pdf.
150. See, e.g., Eli Dourado, How Patent Privateers Have Eroded Mutually Assured
Destruction
in
the
Computer
Industry,
ÜMLAUT
(Oct.
2,
2013),
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antitrust interventions. However, just as above, the Credit Suisse Court
would recognize that regulatory authority within the patent world
already exists to supervise these activities, this time in the form of
patent ownership recordation and equitable estoppel.
Thanks to recordation requirements, the PTO has a wealth of
information at its disposal regarding patent ownership. The PTO
maintains records on initial patent assignees as well as current
assignees.152 It knows whether patents have been subjected to
reexamination and “who requested the reexamination” as well as who
has been paying maintenance fees for which patents.153 The PTO
even knows “whether or not the current owner is a large or small
entity.”154 While not all of this information is currently accessible to
the public,155 policymakers and industry members are already
Together, this information
working to expand availability.156

https://theumlaut.com/2013/10/02/patent-privateers/; Comments of Google,
Blackberry, Earthlink & Red Hat to the Federal Trade Commission and U.S.
Department of Justice on Patent Assertion Entities 16 (Apr. 5, 2013),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2013/04/15/paew-0049.pdf.
151. See, e.g., PROMOTING INNOVATION, supra note 122 (determining that antitrust
law should play a significant role in policing holdup); Erica S. Mintzer & Suzanne
Munck, The Joint U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Workshop on
Patent Assertion Entity Activities—“Follow the Money”, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 423, 437 (2014)
(contending that antitrust law should play a significant role in policing privateering);
Julie Brill, Commissioner, FTC, Introductory Remarks at the Innovation Policy
Summit, The Need for Patent Litigation Reform (Jan. 8, 2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/191751/140108pat
entlitigation.pdf (remarking on the FTC’s extensive review of antitrust intervention
in patent law).
152. Colleen V. Chien, The Who Owns What Problem in Patent Law 6 (Santa Clara
Univ. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 03-12, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1995664.
153. Id. at 6–7.
154. Id.
155. Id.; see also Sipe, supra note 8, at 203 (observing the difficulties in determining
patent ownership).
156. For examples of such proposals, see Patent Transparency and Improvements
Act of 2013, S. 1720, 113th Cong. (2013) (requiring anyone filing a patent
infringement suit to disclose all parties with a financial interest in the outcome or
“any other kind of interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceeding”); Fact Sheet: White House Task Force on High-Tech Patent Issues, WHITE
HOUSE OFF. PRESS SECRETARY (June 4, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-high-tech-patent-issues
(recommending that Congress require disclosure of the “Real Party-in-Interest” on
patents and directing the PTO to begin its rulemaking process to improve
FRONTIER
FOUND.,
transparency);
Defend
Innovation,
ELECTRONIC
https://defendinnovation.org/proposal/improve-notice-function.html (last visited
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“point[s] the recipient of a privateer’s demand letter in the direction
of” its true instigator and provides SSOs with the tools to mitigate the
surprise of hold-up.157
Hold-up activity is also supervised by the equitable estoppel doctrine.
Equitable estoppel is a defense to patent infringement,158 requiring
misleading conduct, which may include not only statements and
actions but silence and inaction, leading another to reasonably
infer that rights will not be asserted against it; (2) reliance upon
this conduct; and (3) due to this reliance, material prejudice if the
delayed assertion of such rights is permitted.159

Equitable estoppel is “founded on principles of fraud,” intended to
prevent one party from taking “unfair advantage of another.”160
Having induced the other party to rely on certain behavior from you,
you are estopped from behaving otherwise and taking advantage of
that reliance.
In this sense, equitable estoppel appears tailor-made to police holdup, and it has in fact already been recognized by the courts as a valid
defense in hold-up cases.161 As one federal court applying equitable
estoppel against hold-up explained,
Ten years before this suit was filed, plaintiff concluded that the
proposed Thrift or MINTS standard infringed his patent. It was
well known to plaintiff and throughout the industry that the same
provisions the plaintiff is relying on for infringement were being
contemplated as national and international standards.
Moreover, . . . plaintiff sat on an American National Standard

Nov. 30, 2016) (“All patent owners should be required to keep their disclosures up to
date throughout the life of the patent, or else the patent will be unenforceable. For
example, patent owners should be required to update ownership and litigation
records in a timely fashion.”).
157. Sipe, supra note 8, at 205.
158. A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1028 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
159. Mabus v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 633 F.3d 1356, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(quoting Lincoln Logs Ltd. v. Lincoln Pre-Cut Log Homes, Inc., 971 F.2d 732, 734
(Fed. Cir. 1992)).
160. Equitable Estoppel, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
161. See, e.g., Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1084 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (limiting patent enforceability for breach of affirmative duty to disclose
pending patent applications to an SSO); Wang Labs., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am.,
Inc., 103 F.3d 1571, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (distinguishing equitable estoppel from an
implied license but noting the applicability of both to the SSO hold-up context);
Stambler v. Diebold Inc., 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1709, 1714 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that the
plaintiff’s “intentionally misleading silence” barred plaintiff’s patent infringement
claim under equitable estoppel), aff’d, 878 F.2d 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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Institute standards committee . . . . Plaintiff subsequently left the
committee without notifying it of the alleged infringement of his
patent. Under these circumstances, plaintiff had a duty to speak
out . . . and his silence was affirmatively misleading. Plaintiff could
not remain silent while an entire industry implemented the
proposed standard and then when the standards were adopted
assert that his patent covered what manufacturers believed to be an
open and available standard.162

Certainly, where a patentee was a member of an SSO and failed to
disclose ownership of potentially relevant patents when asked, the
doctrine applies.163 And the latter two prongs—reliance and material
prejudice—would be relatively easy to prove in nearly any standardsetting context.164
Together then, recordation requirements and equitable estoppel
evince supervisory authority under the patent laws for activities that
abuse opacity in ownership. The former is administered directly by
the PTO, and the latter—as a defense to infringement like misuse—is
another regulatory tool wielded by the ITC and Federal Circuit.165
As with the discussion of patent misuse above,166 this Article
concedes that patent recordation and equitable estoppel will not
necessarily provide the same outcomes in privateering and hold-up
cases as a full-throated application of antitrust law.
Rather,
independent of outcome, Credit Suisse’s preemption analysis would
recognize the existence and applicability of these alternative regulatory
solutions to opacity problems as weighing in favor of preemption. The
risks associated with permitting both regulatory apparatuses to overlap,
explored in detail in Part IV, are simply too great.
B. Quasi-Preemption: Attempts to Control Downstream Use and Sale
The Credit Suisse arguments in favor of preemption are somewhat
weaker where attempts to control downstream product markets are
concerned; supervision and intervention from patent authority is
incomplete, and antitrust law has a more natural role to play. The
partial regulation from patent authority does, however, support

162. Stambler, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1714–15.
163. Robert P. Merges & Jeffrey M. Kuhn, An Estoppel Doctrine for Patented Standards,
97 CAL. L. REV. 1, 11, 23 (2009) (noting that equitable estoppel in the hold-up
context may require “an affirmative communication between two parties,” such as a
patentee submitting an incomplete list of relevant patents).
164. See, e.g., Sipe, supra note 8, at 212–13.
165. See supra Sections II.B–C.
166. See supra Sections II.A.1–2.
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relaxing the higher levels of scrutiny that antitrust law currently applies
to downstream product controls whenever patents are involved.
The previous Section focused largely on patent licensing
arrangements. But a patentee may also attempt to exert control over the
downstream product market, dictating how its patented products are
used or sold. For example, a patentee may require that purchasers of its
patented goods refrain from combining them with any competitor’s
goods.167
If the patentee outsources production to a licensed
manufacturer, it may limit the manufacturer to making the product
within certain specifications and potential uses or limit the manufacturer
to selling the product to a certain customer base.168 A patentee may
even try to forbid sales of its patented product below a certain price.169
What these scenarios have in common is that they feature patent
owners attempting to directly control aspects of the downstream
product market—the customers, prices, and uses. In other words,
they are attempts to exert control not over who may practice the
patent but, rather, what happens to any patented products. As with
the scenarios given in the previous Section, scholars170 and
policymakers171 have proposed full-throated antitrust interventions to
curtail attempts by patentees to exert downstream market control.
The Credit Suisse Court, however, would recognize that regulatory
authority within the patent world already exercises partial supervision
in the form of patent exhaustion doctrine.
Patent exhaustion, like patent misuse, is a defense to
infringement.172 It dictates “that the initial authorized sale of a
patented item terminates all patent rights to that item.”173 As a result,
once a patented item is “lawfully made and sold, there is no
167. Coston, supra note 122; Ullman, supra note 122.
168. Coston, supra note 122; Ullman, supra note 122.
169. See, e.g., Coston, supra note 122; Ullman, supra note 122.
170. For examples of academics supporting antitrust intervention where a
patentee attempts to control downstream product customers, prices, and uses, see
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 922 (2008); Ashley
Doty, Note, Leegin v. PSKS: New Standard, New Challenges, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
655, 683 (2008); Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Resale Price Maintenance: Consignment
Agreements, Copyrighted or Patented Products and the First Sale Doctrine (Univ. Iowa Legal
Studies, Research Paper No. 10-42, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1671943.
171. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
LICENSING
OF
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
25–31
(1995),
THE
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2006/04/27/0558.pdf.
172. Keurig, Inc. v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 732 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
173. Id. at 1373 (quoting Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617,
625 (2008)).
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restriction on [its] use to be implied for the benefit of the
patentee.”174 An infringement claim based on downstream use or sale
will therefore be dismissed as a matter of law.175
Each of the potentially anticompetitive activities listed above—
controlling uses, pricing, and customer bases—has been examined
through the lens of patent exhaustion.176 Just as with patent misuse,
however, the doctrine is not quite coterminous with antitrust law.177
And because exhaustion is a defense to infringement, the same
sources of regulatory authority offer supervision.178 The result thus
far has been findings of exhaustion in most cases where a patentee
attempts to exercise control over the downstream product market.179
However, unlike with patent misuse, the applicability of exhaustion
may not support full preemption of antitrust law. Because these
activities center on the patented goods themselves—rather than
licensing arrangements—a defense to patent infringement will not
itself destroy the anticompetitive scheme; the patentee may still
174. Quanta, 553 U.S. at 630 (alteration in original) (quoting Adams v. Burke, 84
U.S. 453, 457 (1873)).
175. Keurig, 732 F.3d at 1372–73.
176. See, e.g., Quanta, 553 U.S. at 630 (applying exhaustion doctrine to an attempt
by Intel to force purchasers of its patented microprocessors to only combine them
with other Intel computer components); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309
U.S. 436, 451 (1940) (applying exhaustion doctrine to an attempt by Ethyl Gasoline
to forbid retailers from selling its patented gasoline mixture below certain prices);
Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181 (1938) (applying
exhaustion doctrine to an attempt by Western Electric to forbid retailers from selling
its patented vacuum tubes specifically to commercial movie theaters); Mallinckrodt,
Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 701, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (applying exhaustion
doctrine to an attempt by Mallinckrodt to forbid purchasers of its patented aerosol
device from refurbishing or refilling the devices for additional uses).
177. The Federal Circuit did at one point treat patent exhaustion as coterminous
with antitrust violations. See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 701. That approach was
subsequently rejected by the Supreme Court. See Quanta, 553 U.S. at 618; see also
Samuel F. Ernst, Of Printer Cartridges and Patent Exhaustion: The En Banc Federal Circuit
Is
Poised
to
Clarify
Quanta,
PATENTLYO
(Apr.
21,
2015),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/04/cartridges-exhaustion-clarify.html
(“Significantly, the Supreme Court makes no mention of market power, the ‘rule of
reason,’ or any other antitrust policy as the basis for its decision in Quanta. Patent
exhaustion is not merely a reiteration of antitrust law.”).
178. See supra notes 135–39 and accompanying text.
179. The notable exception to this practice has been courts permitting restrictions
that apply to the initial sale of a patented product; for example, a patentee dictating
the price or market in which a licensed manufacturer may sell. See, e.g., Samuel F.
Ernst, Patent Exhaustion for the Exhausted Defendant: Should Parties Be Able to Contract
Around Exhaustion in Settling Patent Litigation?, 2014 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 445, 454
(citing Gen. Talking Pictures, 304 U.S. at 181).
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attempt to enforce its control over downstream use and sale via other
legal mechanisms—contract law, for example.180
Rather than full preemption, this Article advocates a middle-tier,
measured approach with regard to attempts to regulate the
downstream product market. The current trend in antitrust courts is
to generally treat downstream controls on patented goods as more
“inherently suspicious” than unpatented goods.181 But because
exhaustion effectively dissolves the patent angle of these activities,182
antitrust courts should instead proceed as if they are dealing with
unpatented products when engaging in their analysis. This will
prevent many of the dangers of doctrinal overlap: antitrust courts
will not need to consider—or adjudicate—patent issues in their
analysis.183 This middle-tier approach to antitrust intervention stands
in contrast to the analysis for attempts at merger and collusion,
outlined below, where the patents at issue are in full force and
infringement suits themselves threaten competition as a result.
C. No Preemption: Attempts to Collude and Merge
The Credit Suisse arguments in favor of preemption are at their
weakest where patents are essentially used as instruments of collusion
or merger. Supervision and intervention from patent authority are
essentially absent, and antitrust law is operating within its
foundational competency. For example, two competitors may

180. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885
(2007) (examining an attempt to control downstream resale prices with contract
law); In re Fair Allocation Sys., Inc., 126 F.T.C. 626, 635–36 (1998) (examining an
attempt to control downstream market territory and quantities with contract law).
See generally Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, The Economics of Resale Price
Maintenance, in 3 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND
POLICY 1841, 1841 (2008) (examining the impact and efficacy of contractual limits
on downstream price and nonprice attributes).
181. Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First Sale
Doctrine in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 487, 492 (2011) (citing Quanta as
an example of the higher scrutiny applied to downstream controls when patents are
concerned).
182. While the patentee may retain indirect control over certain aspects of the
downstream product market—for example, what price manufacturers may charge for
the initial sale—they have lost the unique patent advantage against downstream users
and retailers: infringement. See id. at 492 (noting that the reason “presence of an IP
right make[s] a difference” in analyzing effects on competition is because
“infringement actions have different advantages and pose different problems” than
mere “contract actions”).
183. The likelihood of antitrust courts to make mistakes and generate inefficiency
while analyzing patent issues is examined in detail infra Part IV.
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attempt to pool their patents in a third-party holding company, and
use it to sue all of their other competitors for infringement,
effectively cartelizing the market.184 One company may also attempt
to acquire its competitor’s patent portfolio, effectively engaging in a
merger and concentrating market share.185
The middle-tier approach outlined above186 would not be effective
for actions that concentrate market share. Because these actions
concern the market for intellectual property rights—either pooling
or acquisition thereof—the existence of the patents cannot be
ignored. On the other hand, antitrust courts analyzing these
activities would have to engage in relatively little adjudication of
actual patent issues.187 Instead, they would be drawing upon the core

184. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 383 (2003) (arguing that competitors’ attempts to pool
or cross-license patents should be subject to strict antitrust analysis); ROBERT C.
MARSHALL & LESLIE M. MARX, THE ECONOMICS OF COLLUSION: CARTELS AND BIDDING
RINGS 151 (2012) (discussing the effects of cartels on other members of the market);
Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div.,
Cross-Licensing and Antitrust Law (May 2, 1997), http://www.justice.gov/atr/speech
/cross-licensing-and-antitrust-law.
185. See Fiona M. Scott Morton, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. for Econ. Analysis,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., Patent Portfolio Acquisitions: An Economic
Analysis 6–10 (Sept. 21, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518966/download;
Fiona M. Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Strategic Patent Acquisitions, 79 ANTITRUST L.J.
463, 484–85 (2014).
186. See supra Section III.B.
187. For example, where two competitors cross-license and then agree (implicitly
or explicitly) to sue all other competitors out of the market, the court does not need
to engage in a lengthy analysis of the patents at issue or take up claim construction in
order to determine market power; predatory collusion between competitors is per se
an antitrust violation. See, e.g., United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 196–97
(1963). See generally Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in
Antitrust Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1213–15 (2008). Where portfolio
acquisitions are concerned, some interpretation of the patents may be required. But
in many cases, an analysis of the downstream market itself—that is, the market for
the products practicing the competitors’ patents—would be sufficient and would
avoid much of the need to delve into the patents themselves. See, e.g., United States
v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 287 (1948); FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., 650 F.3d 1236,
1242 (8th Cir. 2011); Statement of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division on Its
Decision to Close Its Investigations of Google Inc.’s Acquisition of Motorola Mobility Holdings
Inc. and the Acquisitions of Certain Patents by Apple Inc., Microsoft Corp. and Research in
Motion Ltd., U.S. DEP’T JUST. OFF. PUB. AFF. (Feb. 13, 2012),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-department-justice-s-antitrust-division-itsdecision-close-its-investigations (“The division concluded that each of the [portfolio]
transactions was unlikely to substantially lessen competition for wireless devices.”
(emphasis added)).
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foundational competencies of antitrust law: policing collusion and
regulating mergers.188
Moreover, these core competencies are unique to antitrust. None
of the tools of patent regulation mentioned above—misuse,
recordation, estoppel, or exhaustion—have been applied to curtail
collusive behavior or regulate portfolio mergers. Therefore, even
bearing in mind the considerable limitations and flaws of antitrust
law—uncertainty, inefficiency, and imprecision, among others189—
the argument for preemption is at its weakest in this sphere. The key
questions in Credit Suisse’s analysis would not be satisfied because
patent law offers no true alternative supervision. Limiting antitrust
law intervention in the patent sphere to where it is strictly necessary—
as it is here—offers a solution to minimize the potential for
conflicting guidance and error due to overlap.
Actavis is instructive on this point. In the reverse payment scheme
used in Actavis, a patent owner pays a potential competitor to delay
bringing its competing product to market.190 This is “effectively . . . a
cartel.”191 In this scenario, the patent owner and the potential

188. The Clayton Act, for example, was specifically designed to prohibit
companies “whose primary purpose is to hold stocks of other companies” to form a
collusive trust. See DAVID DALE MARTIN, MERGERS AND THE CLAYTON ACT 31 (1959). In
terms of regulating mergers, the specialization and institutional competence of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) is substantial, to say the least. See, e.g., ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 47 (2007), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/repo
rt_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf (determining that the expanded merger
review process used since the 1970s “has led to the development of substantial
expertise within” the DOJ and FTC); Lawrence M. Frankel, The Flawed Institutional
Design of U.S. Merger Review: Stacking the Deck Against Enforcement, 2008 UTAH L. REV.
159, 174 (noting that the DOJ and FTC have “substantial expertise[,] including
lawyers and economists who have spent virtually their entire careers analyzing
mergers”); Nick Cibula, Note, It’s Always a Good Time for a Beer, but What About the
Hops?, 18 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 157, 176 (2013) (arguing that the DOJ and FTC have
“expansive expertise to determine antitrust concerns” such as “merger[s] and
acquisitions”); see also Sipe, supra note 8, at 222 (describing collusion and merger
concerns as the “foundations of antitrust law”).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 8–15.
190. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013) (providing an example of a
reverse-payment scheme); see also supra text accompanying notes 41–42.
191. In re Cipro Cases I & II, 348 P.3d 845, 854 (Cal. 2015) (applying Actavis and
holding that reverse-payment settlement agreements are not immune from antitrust
scrutiny); see also Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for
Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 39–40 (2009) (comparing reverse
payments to collusive market division via “eliminate[ed] competition between
rivals”); Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Patent Settlements and the Supreme Court’s
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competitor are colluding to restrict output to charge higher prices to
consumers and splitting the profits between them. In that sense, the
patent regulatory tools discussed above offer no solution. There is no
overreaching licensing arrangement, for example, that patent misuse
could snuff out. Instead, antitrust law offers its core strengths and
competencies, and largely without needing to adjudicate patentspecific issues at all. Indeed, as the Actavis Court found compelling
in its decision, in reverse payment antitrust cases “it is normally not
necessary to litigate patent validity,” as the antitrust question turns on
the collusive conduct itself.192
Credit Suisse - style concerns are
therefore at their lowest ebb.
To the extent the hierarchy outlined in this Part remains
incomplete, it should nevertheless provide a useful rubric moving
forward. Anticompetitive activities—involving patents or otherwise—
defy entirely neat categorization. New forms of anticompetitive
behavior emerge with every novel addition to commerce and
commercial structure. Moreover, a single scheme may implicate
multiple overlapping categories of activity. But generally speaking,
the above analysis reveals that anticompetitive activities relying on
leveraging patents through licensing arrangements or information
asymmetry are likely supervised through patent misuse doctrine,
recordation requirements, and equitable estoppel doctrine. Courts
and policymakers should be skeptical of antitrust intervention against
these kinds of activities and should strongly consider the possibility of
preemption. In the alternative, anticompetitive activities relying on
downstream control of patented products are only partially
supervised via patent exhaustion doctrine. Preemption may be
viable, but at least some antitrust intervention is likely warranted.
Finally, anticompetitive activities relying on patents as instruments of
collusion or merger have little to no supervision from patent
authorities. Despite skepticism of—and costs associated with—
antitrust law, courts and policymakers should not hesitate to apply
full-throated antitrust intervention to these kinds of activities.

Actavis Decision, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 3, 8–9 (2014) (explaining the similarities
in effect between a two-person cartel and a monopoly held by one person).
192. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236. But see Joshua B. Fischman, The Circular Logic of
Actavis, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 123–24 (2016) (arguing that the Court inappropriately
equivocated patent validity with the terms of a reverse-payment settlement).
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IV. RISK OF CONFLICT
The previous two Parts examined the existing sources of regulatory
authority in the patent context—the PTO, the ITC, and the Federal
Circuit—to create a hierarchy of potentially anticompetitive patent
activities, categorizing them based on the degree to which they are
already under patent-specific supervision. Where that alternative
supervision exists, as the Credit Suisse Court recognized, the benefits
of overlapping antitrust intervention are marginal. Of equal—if not
greater—concern, however, are the costs of overlapping antitrust
intervention.
The bulk of the Court’s analysis in Credit Suisse was dedicated to
calculating those costs in the securities context. Due to the “fine,
complex, detailed line” separating activity the SEC permits and activity
the SEC forbids, the “contradictory inferences” that might arise from
identical behavior, the “need for securities-related expertise” in
adjudication, the “risk of inconsistent court results,” and the danger of
permitting plaintiffs to “dress what is essentially a securities complaint in
antitrust clothing,” the Credit Suisse Court determined that “antitrust
courts are likely to make unusually serious mistakes” where they
intervene with securities law.193 As a result, the Court stated, permitting
antitrust law and securities law to overlap would likely “produce
conflicting guidance, requirements, duties, privileges, or standards of
conduct.”194 This Part extends that analysis to the patent context where
the costs are equally substantial. Each of the above concerns is just as
pressing in the patent sphere—if not moreso.
A. The Fine Lines of Patent Law
In Credit Suisse, the Court characterized the line separating permissible
and impermissible securities activity as “fine, complex, [and]
detailed.”195 Accordingly, allowing antitrust and securities law to apply
simultaneously would be particularly likely to produce conflicting
guidance and requirements. The Court illustrated this dilemma:
It will often be difficult for someone who is not familiar with
accepted syndicate practices to determine with confidence whether
an underwriter has insisted that an investor buy more shares in the
immediate aftermarket (forbidden), or has simply allocated more
shares to an investor willing to purchase additional shares of that

193. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 279, 280–82, 284, 281–
82 (2007).
194. Id. at 275–76.
195. Id. at 279, 282.
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issue in the long run (permitted). And who but a securities expert
could say whether the present SEC rules set forth a virtually
permanent line, unlikely to change in ways that would permit the
sorts of . . . conduct that it now seems to forbid?196

Patent law is similarly replete with fine doctrinal lines separating
the permissible and the forbidden. To provide just a few key
examples, the frameworks governing patent misuse, exhaustion,
inequitable conduct, and contributory infringement are highly
complex and continue to develop and evolve.
As explained in Part III, patent misuse and exhaustion are
equitable defenses to infringement.197 The former applies where a
patentee “impermissibly broadened the ‘physical or temporal scope’
of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect.”198 The patent then
becomes “unenforceable until the misuse is purged.”199 The latter
applies where a patented item has been “lawfully made and sold,”
after which “there is no restriction on [its] use to be implied for the
benefit of the patentee.”200 An infringement claim based on
downstream use or sale will therefore be dismissed as a matter of
law.201 The Federal Circuit, reviewing these defenses,202 is forced to
thus grapple with complex, “murk[y]” questions.203 In terms of
patent misuse: What is outside the scope of any given patent grant?
Has this particular patent been “leveraged” as part of the alleged
anticompetitive scheme? How should courts analyze and resolve
portfolio—rather than individual patent—misuse?204 In terms of
exhaustion: Does the article sold sufficiently embody the “essential
features” of the patent?205 To what extent can parties contract

196. Id. at 280.
197. See supra notes 128–31, 172–75 and accompanying text.
198. B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(quoting Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001–02 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
199. Id. at 1427.
200. Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 629–30 (2008)
(alteration in original) (quoting Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 457 (1873)).
201. Keurig, Inc. v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 732 F.3d 1370, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
202. See supra notes 94–96 (discussing the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction).
203. Oliver, supra note 129, at 67; see also John W. Osborne, A Coherent View of
Patent Exhaustion: A Standard Based on Patentable Distinctiveness, 20 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 643, 646 (2004) (describing the “general statement” of
patent exhaustion doctrine as “deceptively simple,” but acknowledging that courts’
application of the doctrine “has not been simple, straightforward, or consistent”).
204. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(en banc).
205. Osborne, supra note 203, at 646.
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around exhaustion?206 As a result, there is already “foreseeable
polymorphism” in the doctrines of patent misuse and exhaustion,
and “unforeseeable strains of potential misbehaviors” are likely to
emerge.207 Allowing generalist antitrust courts to intervene would
only produce greater uncertainty and, ultimately, conflicting and
inconsistent results.
Inequitable conduct is another equitable defense to patent
infringement.208
To successfully assert a claim of inequitable
conduct, the accused infringer must show that the patentee failed to
disclose information, such as prior art, in its patent application.209
The patentee must also have “specific intent to deceive the PTO,”
such that the “PTO would not have granted the patent but for [the]
failure to disclose.”210 The remedy, as expressed by the Federal
Circuit, is the “‘atomic bomb’ of patent law”: “inequitable conduct
regarding any single claim renders the entire patent
unenforceable.”211 The result is a fine line to adjudicate. Because the
Federal Circuit has determined that “intent and materiality are
separate elements . . . that . . . should not be put on a sliding scale
with one another,” the crucial—and highly technical—question of
whether or not the patentee’s alleged deception was the “but for”
cause of the PTO’s grant must be addressed fully in every case.212
Again, inconsistency and uncertainty would mar this already complex
doctrine if antitrust courts were left to adjudicate these claims.

206. See, e.g., Yuichi Watanabe, The Doctrine of Patent Exhaustion: The Impact of
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 273, 285–87 & nn.80–99
(2009). To wit, sufficiently egregious attempts to contract around exhaustion may
themselves trigger misuse. See USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 510–12
(7th Cir. 1982).
207. Richard Li-dar Wang, Deviated, Unsound, and Self-Retreating: A Critical
Assessment of the Princo v. ITC En Banc Decision, 16 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 51, 72–
73 (2012).
208. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1285 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (en banc) (describing the use of inequitable conduct to “bar[]
enforcement of a patent” and “dismiss patent cases involving egregious
misconduct”).
209. Id. at 1290.
210. Id. at 1290, 1296.
211. Id. at 1288 (quoting Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d
1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting)).
212. James J. Schneider, Comment, Therasense-less: How the Federal Circuit Let
Policy Overtake Precedent in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 53 B.C. L.
REV. ELECTRONIC SUPPLEMENT 223, 229 (2012) (citing Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290),
http://bclawreview.org/files/2012/04/18_schneider.pdf.

SIPE.TO.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

12/15/2016 3:35 PM

PREEMPTING CONFLICT

457

As opposed to direct infringement, contributory infringement
covers situations where a party does not sell the patented article or
practice the patented process, but instead
offers to sell or sells . . . a material or apparatus for use in
practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the
invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially
adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
noninfringing use . . . .213

For a plaintiff’s claim of contributory infringement to succeed, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant “knew that the
combination for which its components were especially made was both
patented and infringing,” and that the “components have ‘no substantial
noninfringing uses.’”214 In practice, contributory infringement claims
can be incredibly complex, not only in technical terms—understanding
how components may be used together or separately in infringing or
noninfringing ways—but doctrinally as well. For example, there is a
delicate line between raising a successful contributory infringement
claim and impermissibly trying to extend the scope of one’s patent over
unpatented devices—potentially triggering misuse.215 With the risk of a
finding of unenforceability on one side and the possibility of rampant
third-party infringement on the other, the costs of antitrust courts
generating conflicting guidance or contributing to uncertainty in this
doctrine would be quite high.
Altogether, the degree of complexity associated with patent
doctrines, such as misuse, exhaustion, inequitable conduct, and
contributory infringement, weigh in favor of preemption under Credit
Suisse’s analysis. If permitted instead to overlap, there is a significant
risk that patent law and antitrust law would produce conflicting
guidance and requirements. Just as generalist antitrust courts would
struggle to distinguish permissible and forbidden securities
213. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2012).
214. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(quoting Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293,
1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
215. See, e.g., Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 201 (1980)
(determining that the owner of a process patent can only use contributory
infringement to block the sale of unpatented “nonstaple goods” without triggering
misuse). See generally A. Samuel Oddi, Contributory Infringement/Patent Misuse:
Metaphysics and Metamorphosis, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 73, 75 (1982) (exploring the
historical and ongoing tension between the two doctrines of contributory
infringement and patent misuse; in particular, the complexity of the post-Dawson
staple-nonstaple dichotomy).
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arrangements—and fail to accurately forecast potential changes in
securities law216—they would struggle with the equally delicate and
fine lines of patent doctrine.
B. The Danger of Contradictory Inferences
The Credit Suisse Court also pointed out the danger that
contradictory inferences may be drawn from “overlapping evidence”
showing both “unlawful antitrust activity and . . . lawful securities
marketing activity,” which would further increase the odds of
conflicting guidance and requirements from antitrust law and
securities law.217 The Court provided the following example:
[E]vidence tending to show unlawful antitrust activity and evidence
tending to show lawful securities marketing activity may overlap, or
prove identical. Consider, for instance, a conversation between an
underwriter and an investor about how long an investor intends to
hold the new shares (and at what price), say, a conversation that
elicits comments concerning both the investor’s short and longer
term plans. That exchange . . . might help to establish an effort to
collect an unlawfully high commission . . . through the sales of less
popular stocks. Or it might prove only that the underwriter
allocates more popular shares to investors who will help stabilize
the aftermarket share price.218

This same concern—overlapping and similar, yet not coterminous
standards—holds equally true for antitrust law and patent law. The
examples given in the previous Section are illustrative on this point as well:
misuse, exhaustion, inequitable conduct, and contributory infringement.219
Although anticompetitive effect is a necessary component of a
successful claim of patent misuse,220 making the principles of antitrust

216. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 282 (2007).
217. Id. at 281–82.
218. Id. at 281.
219. See generally Deborah A. Garza, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice Antitrust Div., Remarks Before the Intellectual Property Owners Association,
Antitrust and Competition Law, Standards Setting and Pharmaceutical Issues
Committees Conference, The Increasing Role of Antitrust Principles in Defining
Patent Rights (June 9, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/remarksincreasing-role-antitrust-principles-defining-patent-rights (“And several aspects of
patent law—such as misuse, patent exhaustion doctrine, and the standards used to
determine whether an invention is patentable and whether to enjoin infringement—
are designed . . . to preserve and protect competition.”).
220. See Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(en banc) (rejecting a misuse claim in part due to the alleged infringer’s failure to
demonstrate anticompetitive effects).
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law relevant, antitrust law and patent misuse are not coterminous.221
Anticompetitive conduct that constitutes patent misuse may not rise
to the level of an antitrust violation222 and vice versa.223 Though
patent exhaustion is also intended to safeguard competition, it too is
disjointed from antitrust liability.224 Similarly, while inequitable
conduct has overlapping concerns with antitrust law,225 the two are
not synchronized in terms of liability.226
With contributory
infringement, there is considerable crossover—but also conflict—
with antitrust tying doctrine.227 Specifically, a patent owner may use
221. The coterminous approach to antitrust and misuse was, in fact, specifically
rejected by Congress the last time misuse doctrine was revisited via legislation. See S.
REP. NO. 100-492, at 17–18 (1988). See generally Joel R. Bennett, Patent Misuse: Must
an Alleged Infringer Prove an Antitrust Violation?, 17 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 2 (1989); Kenneth J.
Burchfiel, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Reform: “Blessed Be the Tie?”, 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
1, 2 n.9 (1991).
222. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140
(1969) (determining that even if the lower court found misuse, “it does not
necessarily follow that the misuse embodies the ingredients of a violation of either
[section] 1 or [section] 2 of the Sherman Act”).
223. See, e.g., Princo, 616 F.3d at 1329 (“While proof of an antitrust violation shows
that the [patentee] has committed wrongful conduct having anticompetitive effects,
that does not establish misuse of the patent in suit unless the conduct in question
restricts the use of that patent and does so in one of the specific ways that have been
held to be outside the otherwise broad scope of the patent grant.”).
224. See Garza, supra note 219; supra note 177.
225. See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust, Inequitable Conduct, and the Intent to
Deceive the Patent Office, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 323, 325 (2011) (“Invalid patents
undermine both the patent system and the competitive marketplace. They raise
entry costs and delay market entry, deter customers and business partners from
contracting with new entrants . . . and hurt innovation.”); Christopher R. Leslie, The
Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 103 (2006)
(“Even supporters of strong patent protection have generally not quarreled with
antitrust law’s treatment of patents procured through fraud.”).
226. See, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S.
172, 173, 177–78 (1965) (explaining that if “the exclusionary power of the illegal
patent claim,” for example, is proved, “the maintenance and enforcement of a patent
obtained by fraud on the Patent Office may be the basis of an action under [section]
2 of the Sherman Act,” but it is not so automatically); see also Nobelpharma AB v.
Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1069 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Consistent with the
Supreme Court’s analysis in Walker Process . . . we have distinguished ‘inequitable
conduct’ from Walker Process fraud, noting that inequitable conduct is a broader,
more inclusive concept than the common law fraud needed to support a Walker
Process counterclaim.”).
227. Tying is the more generic antitrust term for schemes like package licensing,
wherein a purchaser is forced to purchase certain items together rather than
individually. See Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Analysis of Tying Arrangements and
Exclusive Dealing, in ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 183–85 (Keith N. Hylton ed.,
2010). More precisely, it is an antitrust violation to use “market power” in one good
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claims of contributory infringement to force purchases of unpatented
goods upon consumers of patented products in a manner that may or
may not rise to the level of an antitrust violation.228 Moreover,
antitrust principles even come into play at the remedies stage for
successful contributory infringement claims.229
C. The Need for Patent-Related Expertise
Another of the key reasons given in Credit Suisse as to why
overlapping antitrust and securities law would produce conflict was
the “need for securities-related expertise” in adjudication.230
Specifically, the Court noted that the SEC has the “expertise to draw
that line” between what should and should not be permissible under
securities law.231 This same reasoning applies with equal, if not
greater, force in the realm of patent law. Patent law requires not only
an understanding of patented technologies themselves—ranging
from the particular biochemistry of pharmaceuticals to the pure
number theory underpinning high-level cryptography—but also an
to force consumers to purchase an additional “tied” good, thereby “foreclos[ing] a
substantial volume of commerce.” United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 84–
85 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (examining Microsoft’s practice of forcing
consumers to purchase its Internet browser by bundling it into Microsoft’s operating
system software).
228. Charles W. Adams, A Brief History of Indirect Liability for Patent Infringement, 22
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 369, 370 (2006). Professor Adams argues
that it was the early abuses of contributory infringement that led to the creation of
the Clayton Act (and its prohibition of certain tying arrangements) in the first place.
Id. But, as with antitrust claims based on inequitable conduct under Walker Process,
exclusionary market power must be shown to make out an antitrust violation and
may not be present in every case of abusive contributory infringement claims. See,
e.g., Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006) (noting that “the
mere fact that a tying product is patented does not support such a presumption” of
market power).
229. Instead of an injunction, the court may engage in compulsory licensing,
forcing the patentee to accept a given royalty from the infringer and permitting the
infringer to legally practice the patent. JAMES PACKARD LOVE, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY
INT’L, RECENT EXAMPLES OF THE USE OF COMPULSORY LICENSES ON PATENTS 3–6 (2007),
http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/recent_cls_8mar07.pdf.
These “compulsory
licenses are generally authorized” where an injunction would be “anti-competitive”—
even if the patentee has not committed an antitrust violation—or where there is
otherwise significant “public need.” Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to
Innovation: Does the Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853, 859 (2003); see also Kenneth J. Nunnenkamp, Compulsory
Licensing of Critical Patents Under CERCLA?, 9 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 397, 408
& n.45 (1994).
230. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 281–82 (2007).
231. Id. at 285.
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understanding of potential economic effects on innovation,
implementation, use, and downstream or substitute markets.
Professor Wasserman summarizes the view among academics: “There
is near-universal agreement that the institution charged with creating
sound patent policy needs access both to economic and to
technological data, as well as sufficient expertise to analyze and
interpret this information.”232
The sources of regulatory authority outlined in Part II—the PTO,
the ITC, and the Federal Circuit—are well-stocked with this exact
expertise. The PTO has classic information-gathering mechanisms at its
disposal including hearings,233 research studies,234 and cross-contact with
other agencies.235 This is in addition to the considerable expertise
cultivated among scientifically-trained patent examiners,236 the
Administrative Patent Judges on the Patent Trial and Appeal Board,237
and the staff within the newly created Office of the Chief Economist.238
In short, “the PTO possesses superior pathways to acquire technological

232. Wasserman, supra note 65, at 2008; see also Michael J. Burstein, Rules for
Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 1777–78 (2011) (“Patent policy in particular
requires the application of technological and economic analysis . . . .”); Rai, supra
note 56, at 1262 (“[E]xpertise in both economics and technology is a highly
desirable attribute for any institution creating patent policy.”).
233. See, e.g., Transcripts of the Public Hearings on Biotechnology, U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. (Oct. 17, 1994, 9:00 AM), https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com
/hearings/biotech/biotrans.html.
234. See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL PATENT
PROTECTIONS
FOR
SMALL
BUSINESSES
1–3
(2012),
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/aia_implementation/20120113-ippr_report.pdf.
235. See, e.g., Rai, supra note 56, at 1255–57 (noting the dialogue between the
National Institutes of Health and the PTO regarding DNA patent policy).
236. As of 2014, the PTO had employed more than 9300 patent examiners to
process over 618,000 patent applications. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2014, at 11, 143 (2014)
[hereinafter PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY], https://www.uspto.gov/about/strat
plan/ar/USPTOFY2014PAR.pdf.
237. From late 2014 to mid-2015, between 214 and 235 judges on the PTAB
adjudicated over 9900 examination appeals. NATHAN K. KELLEY & SCOTT R. BOALICK,
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD UPDATE, 7, 34
(2015), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/20150820_PPAC_PTA
B_Update.pdf; PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 236, at 55. The PTAB
also heard 1310 AIA petitions, including post-grant and inter partes reviews. U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD STATISTICS 4 (2015),
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2015-04-30%20PTAB.pdf.
238. Office of Chief Economist, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/
about-us/organizational-offices/office-policy-and-international-affairs/office-chiefeconomist (last visited Nov. 30, 2016).
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and economic data, as well as the expertise to evaluate and analyze this
information to craft substantive patent law standards.”239
The ITC, given its statutory requirement to adjudicate patent
infringement claims,240 has not only a “high level of expertise in
patent law” but also “deep knowledge of the narrow range of
technologies that are repeatedly the subject of section 337
investigations,”241 such as telecommunications, computers, and
Furthermore, the ITC has developed
medical technology.242
considerable economic expertise, given its need to consider “antitrust
and equitable principles, and the public policy of promoting ‘free
competition’” in its decision making.243 Altogether, the depth and
breadth of the ITC’s expertise has been recognized by an array of
scholars,244 and even the Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit.245
The Federal Circuit’s own expertise in patent law is considerable.
The court’s jurisdiction includes all appeals arising under the Patent
Act246 in addition to appeals of patent decisions from the PTO247 and
239. Wasserman, supra note 65, at 2018.
240. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012); see also supra text accompanying
notes 78–85. In 2014, the ITC had ninety-three active section 337 investigations
involving determinations of patent infringement. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, FY 2014
AT A GLANCE:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IMPORT INVESTIGATIONS 1 (2015),
https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/documents/yir_op2_2015.pdf.
241. Kumar, supra note 80, at 1586.
242. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IMPORT INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 240, at 1
(providing statistics on the different products involved in section 337 investigations).
243. S. REP. NO. 93-1298, at 196 (1974) (discussing the ITC’s role in investigating
complaints, as envisioned by the Tariff Act); see also Kumar, supra note 80, at 1563
(stating that the scope of the ITC’s determinations “encompasses, at minimum,
issues involving patents, international trade, and antitrust law”).
244. See, e.g., Maria Raia Hamilton, Process Patents and the Limits of the International
Trade Commission’s Jurisdiction: Finding the Line in the Sand, 50 IDEA 161, 183 n.121
(2010) (indicating that ITC judges mostly hear patent disputes, so they are
considered to have “greater technical expertise” than Article III judges); Kumar,
supra note 80, at 1555; Michael Meehan, Increasing Certainty and Harnessing Private
Information in the U.S. Patent System: A Proposal for Reform, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1,
¶ 106; Kali N. Murray, The Cooperation of Many Minds: Domestic Patent Reform in a
Heterogeneous Regime, 48 IDEA 289, 333 (2008); Schwartz, supra note 86, at 1702;
Herbert C. Shelley et al., The Standard of Review Applied by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in International Trade and Customs Cases, 45 AM. U. L. REV.
1749, 1801 (1996).
245. See Interview by Douglas Lichtman with Paul R. Michel, Chief Judge, U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit (Jan. 5, 2009), http://www.ipcolloquium.com/
Programs/Players/4.html (describing the Administrative Law Judges within the ITC
as “specialist” judges and—“loosely”—“expert patent judges”).
246. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2012); see supra notes 94–96.
247. § 1295(a)(4)(A).
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the ITC.248 This broad jurisdictional grant has led many to label the
Federal Circuit as the unique “expert court” among the otherwise
“generalist” regional federal appellate courts.249 In addition, the
Federal Circuit’s exclusive position—both in terms of patent appeals
and in reviewing the ITC and PTO—provides a natural bottleneck for
expertise to converge and cross-pollinate.
As the Court recognized in Credit Suisse, “antitrust courts are likely
to make unusually serious mistakes” in areas of law where expertise is
necessary.250 In addition, allowing generalist antitrust courts to
encroach upon and shape patent law would effectively squander the
considerable collective expertise of the PTO, the ITC, and the
Federal Circuit. This expertise mismatch strongly suggests the need
for a minimally overlapping role for antitrust law and patent law, if
not preemption entirely under Credit Suisse.
D. The Risk of Inconsistency
The Credit Suisse Court additionally noted the risk that antitrust
courts, “with different nonexpert judges and different nonexpert
juries” will find it difficult to “reach consistent results” as a reason why
antitrust law and securities law, if simultaneously applicable, would be
likely to produce conflicting guidance and requirements.251 This risk
looms large in the patent context as well. As outlined above, the
need for expertise in adjudicating patent disputes is substantial;252 as
a result, nonexpert judges dealing with cases involving patents are apt
to produce inconsistent results. But there is also uncertainty and
inconsistency built into the applicable antitrust doctrine itself: in
antitrust cases involving patents, courts have increasingly abandoned
predictable rules and eliminated useful presumptions that might
otherwise create consistency.

248. § 1295(a)(5)–(6).
249. See, e.g., Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1791, 1839 (2013); Kumar, supra note 80, at 1549, 1589; Banks Miller & Brett
Curry, Experts Judging Experts: The Role of Expertise in Reviewing Agency Decision Making,
38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 55, 56, 60 (2013); Amy R. Motomura, Federal Circuit Deference:
Two Regimes in Conflict, 119 PA. ST. L. REV. 925, 952 (2015); Joan E. Schaffner, Federal
Circuit “Choice of Law”: Erie Through the Looking Glass, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1173, 1176,
1179, 1218 (1996) (arguing that the Federal Circuit should have broader authority to
assert independent judgment on “all substantive law issues which compromise a
‘patent related case’” due to the court’s expertise).
250. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 282 (2007).
251. Id. at 281.
252. See supra Section IV.C.
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Over the past few decades, the Supreme Court has eliminated a
number of specialized antitrust rules and analytical carve-outs created
for patents in favor of bringing patents into the general antitrust
fold.253 The Court has largely accomplished this task by folding
patent cases into the relatively unpredictable rule of reason.254 The
rule of reason is a holistic test to determine whether certain conduct
constitutes an illegal restraint of trade, eschewing clear standards in
favor of flexibility and totality:
[T]he court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the
business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and
after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its
effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the
purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is
not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable
regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help
the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.255

The trend towards an all-encompassing rule of reason approach to
antitrust has produced costly,256 fact-intensive litigation with highly
uncertain outcomes.257 As Professor Robin Feldman summarized,
“[T]here is nothing messier than the rule of reason . . . [whose]

253. See Robin Feldman, Ending Patent Exceptionalism and Structuring the Rule of
Reason: The Supreme Court Opens the Door for Both, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 62–63
(2014) (asserting that the Supreme Court’s decision in Actavis created an
opportunity to structure the rule of reason in order to mitigate patent
exceptionalism); Lee, supra note 122, at 1416.
254. Feldman, supra note 253, at 73–74; Shubha Ghosh, Convergence?, 15 MINN. J.L.
SCI. & TECH. 95, 113 (2014) (“More engagement with the policies underlying
competition would be desirable. Instead, those thinking about antitrust engage with
models of markets that may provide some guidance but lead invariably to the rule of
reason.”); Lee, supra note 122, at 1445 (noting that the Supreme Court’s move
toward the rule of reason is apparent in “tying arrangements and reverse patent
settlements”).
255. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
256. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (1984)
(“Litigation costs are the product of vague rules combined with high stakes, and nowhere
is that combination more deadly than in antitrust litigation under the Rule of Reason.”);
Ghosh, supra note 254, at 102 (arguing that the “litigation costs” under the rule of reason
are so high that it effectively “serve[s] to immunize patent owners from suit”).
257. See Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Joint-Venture Analysis After American Needle,
7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 543, 546 (2011) (“Full-blown rule-of-reason analysis
subjects defendants to considerable expense and uncertainty.”); see also Andrew I.
Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The Modern Rule of Reason in
Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 738 n.28 (2012) (“The proposition that rule of reason
litigation can be uncertain and costly . . . does not appear to be controversial.”).
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analysis is so complex that it is a burden on litigants and the judicial
system.”258 Perhaps ironically, some of the most strident criticism of
the all-encompassing rule of reason has come from the Supreme
Court itself.259 To the extent that bringing antitrust cases involving
patents into the general, all-purpose rule of reason eliminates
otherwise bright-line rules and presumptions, it inevitably generates
uncertainty in its own right.260 More importantly for the purposes of
this Article, the rule of reason forces antitrust courts in practice to
analyze more and more patent law issues—analysis for which antitrust
courts are ill-equipped.261
For example, the existence of “market power”262 is a necessary
predicate to certain antitrust violations, such as tying.263 In Illinois
Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.,264 the Supreme Court
eliminated the presumption that a patent confers “market power”
over the products covered by the patent; in doing so, the Court

258. Feldman, supra note 253, at 63.
259. See, e.g., Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 34 (1984)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that the “costs of a rule-of-reason approach”
necessarily include “elaborate inquir[ies] into the economic effects of” the particular
suspect conduct), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28
(2006); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977) (“[P]er se
rules tend to provide guidance to the business community and to minimize the
burdens on litigants and the judicial system of the more complex rule-of-reason
trials . . . .”); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (noting that rule of
reason analysis requires “incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation
into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort
to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable—an inquiry
so often wholly fruitless when undertaken”); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273
U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (noting that rule of reason analysis frequently requires “minute
inquiry [into] whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable”).
260. See David Olson & Stefania Fusco, Rules Versus Standards: Competing Notions of
Inconsistency Robustness in Patent Law, 64 ALA. L. REV. 647, 664 (2013) (discussing how
the loss of presumptions and bright-line rules governing patents removes
“predictability” and “allows more inconsistency to persist in the system”).
261. But see Mark S. Levy, Comment, Big Pharma Monopoly: Why Consumers Keep
Landing on “Park Place” and How the Game Is Rigged, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 247, 283–85
(2016) (advocating for courts to apply the rule of reason in patent-related
pharmaceutical cases, such as REMS manipulation and product hopping).
262. Market power is generally defined as “the ability to raise prices above those
that would be charged in a competitive market.” NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S.
85, 109 n.38 (1984).
263. See supra note 227 (defining “tying” and explaining its implications for
consumers and commerce). See generally WILLIAM BREIT, THE ANTITRUST CASEBOOK:
MILESTONES IN ECONOMIC REGULATION 218–20 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing examples of
tying arrangements analyzed by the Court and outlining the doctrine’s evolution).
264. 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
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moved tying cases to a rule of reason analysis.265 Legal academics and
economists had long criticized that presumption as inaccurate in
many cases.266 But the marginal gain in accuracy267 has come at the
loss of consistency and predictability268 and an increase in the need
for antitrust courts to delve into patent interpretation. The question
of whether market power exists over a certain product forces courts
to consider potential substitutes for that product;269 so when patents
are involved, the courts must—at least implicitly—determine the
precise scope of the patent: What hypothetical substitute products or
uses would not be infringing?270 This act of “translating the words of
the [patent] into a meaningful technological context [is] one of the
most difficult problems in patent law.”271 And yet, in these antitrust
cases, it would be the inconsistent regional circuits, rather than the
Federal Circuit, reviewing patent interpretations.272

265. See id. at 31. Before Illinois Tool Works, “requisite economic power [was]
presumed when the tying product [was] patented.” United States v. Loew’s Inc., 371
U.S. 38, 45 (1962) (citing Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947),
abrogated by Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. 28), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. 28.
266. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS & MARK A. LEMLEY, IP AND
ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW § 4.2(a) (Supp. 2005) (arguing that intellectual property rights grant power to
exclude but do not necessarily confer market power); Burchfiel, supra note 221, at
57, 77–79 (1991) (commenting that the presumption is anecdotal and not supported
by facts); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 184, at 374.
267. See Dennis J. Abdelnour, Note, Illinois Tool Works: Allocating the Burden of
Proving Market Power in Patent Tying Cases, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 365, 380–84
(2007) (discussing classes of patents that would rightfully have a presumption of
market power).
268. See supra notes 254–60; see also David O. Taylor, Formalism and Antiformalism in
Patent Law Adjudication: Rules and Standards, 46 CONN. L. REV. 415, 423, 495 (2013)
(arguing that patent law has an exceptional need for certainty and bright-line rules
relative to other doctrines).
269. See, e.g., Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 37–38 n.7 (1984)
(plurality opinion); Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power
in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 241, 256–57 n.75 (1987).
270. In the case of a package license analyzed as a tying scheme, the court’s need
to delve into patent analysis is doubled: Which patent licenses are substitutes for
other patent licenses? The question surely cannot be answered without first
interpreting the patents in the package, delving into claim construction, and then
doing the same for the arguable substitute patents.
271. Lee Petherbridge, The Claim Construction Effect, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH.
L. REV. 215, 218 (2008).
272. Where the plaintiff brings a non-patent law cause of action, such as an
antitrust tying claim, appellate jurisdiction is generally with the regional courts
rather than the Federal Circuit even if patents are factually involved. See Holmes
Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830, 834 (2002).
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In short, the Credit Suisse Court recognized the “risk that antitrust
courts, with different nonexpert judges and different nonexpert
juries, will produce inconsistent results” in areas of law where
significant expertise is required, such as patent law.273 This threat of
inconsistency has only been heightened by the trend to eliminate
specialized antitrust rules and analytical carve-outs for patents that
might otherwise prevent nonexpert courts from having to deal with
patent intricacies. The end result is a high probability of conflicting
guidance and requirements where patent law and antitrust law are
simultaneously applicable, counseling in favor of preemption.
E. The Potential for Forum-Shopping
Finally, the Credit Suisse Court noted that if antitrust law and
securities law are simultaneously applicable, there is a danger of
“permitting plaintiffs to dress what is essentially a securities complaint
in antitrust clothing,” thereby avoiding securities-specific
procedures.274 Circumventing these specialized procedures, the
Court argued, would further contribute to conflicting guidance and
requirements.275 Patent law features not only specialized procedures
but an entirely separate court of appeals.276 As discussed above,
bringing patents into the general antitrust fold has the end result of
requiring generalist courts to analyze patent issues.277 Because the
issues in antitrust cases involving patents evade unified Federal
Circuit review, the Credit Suisse Court would be highly concerned
about potential conflict.
Exacerbating the problem, this jurisdictional side-stepping can also
happen in reverse: litigants may avoid the otherwise controlling
regional circuit by dressing up their antitrust claims with tacked-on
patent claims, thereby ending up before the Federal Circuit on
appeal. Before 1998, this would not have been a problem because
“the general jurisprudence of the Federal Circuit had been to apply
its own substantive law to patent issues and the appropriate regional
circuit law to non-patent issues,” including antitrust issues.278 But
273. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 281 (2007).
274. Id. at 284.
275. Id. at 281–82.
276. See supra notes 94–96.
277. See supra Section IV.D.
278. Claudette Espanol, Comment, The Federal Circuit: Jurisdictional Expansion into
Antitrust Issues Relating to Patent Enforcement, 2 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 307, 315 (2005)
(citing Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir.
1998)). For an example of the Federal Circuit’s pre-Nobelpharma approach, see Atari,
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over the past two decades, the Federal Circuit has created its own
body of antitrust law that is distinct and separate from the bodies of
antitrust law for each of the regional circuits.279 This puts district
courts in a considerable bind when antitrust and patent claims
overlap: Should they apply the Federal Circuit’s antitrust law or the
law of their regional circuit?280 To the extent that different districts—
across different types of cases—vary in their answer to that
question,281 the overlap between patent and antitrust law will
continue to generate inconsistency and conflict.
Taken together, these concerns paint a relatively bleak picture
where patent law and antitrust law overlap. The fine, precise
doctrinal lines within patent law are likely to be warped. Similar
economic and competitive considerations—but not identical
standards—make contradictory inferences inevitable. Generalist
courts are forced to adjudicate patent issues over which they lack the
requisite expertise. Across courts, results are virtually certain to be
inconsistent—a phenomenon only made worse by the potential for
forum-shopping. In short, the risk that the patent and antitrust laws,
“if both applicable, would produce conflicting guidance,
requirements, duties, privileges, or standards of conduct” is at least as
great as the risk associated with the securities-antitrust overlap.282
Looking at the longstanding, fundamental tension between patent
law and antitrust law—and the considerable ink spilled by academics

Inc. v. JS & A Grp., Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (applying the law of the
“involved circuit” to all issues over which the Federal Circuit did not have exclusive
jurisdiction), overruled by Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1068.
279. Espanol, supra note 278, at 318 (noting that the Federal Circuit applies its
own body of antitrust law, not regional circuit precedent, to “antitrust claims
premised on the bringing of a patent infringement suit”).
280. See id. at 325 (“[T]here may be conflicting authority on the same issues,
depending on where an appeal will be brought . . . . A district court must adhere to
Federal Circuit precedent in interpreting and applying patent law. At the same time,
a district court is also required to respect the authority of its regional circuit court
when interpreting non-patent specific issues.”); James B. Kobak, Jr., The Federal Circuit
as a Competition Law Court, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 527, 530–32 (2001).
281. For example, in Spotless Enterprises, Inc. v. Carlisle Plastics, Inc., the Eastern
District of New York followed the Second Circuit, rather than the Federal Circuit, in
holding that bad faith was not required as part of a patent-based unfair competition
claim. 56 F. Supp. 2d 274, 286–87 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (explicitly rejecting Hunter
Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). Other
districts instead followed the Federal Circuit’s holding that bad faith was required.
See, e.g., Moore N. Am., Inc. v. Poser Bus. Forms, Inc., No. CIV.A.97-712-SLR, 2000
WL 1480992, at *6 (D. Del. Sept. 29, 2000).
282. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 275–76 (2007).
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and policymakers in unsuccessful attempts to resolve that tension—
the conclusion that the risk is in fact far greater becomes inescapable.
V. THE UNIQUE NATURE OF PATENT-ANTITRUST INTERPLAY
The preemption arguments in Parts II, III, and IV proceeded by
attempting to apply the Credit Suisse framework as narrowly as possible.
While the analysis in Credit Suisse elevates what might be more
appropriately termed policy arguments into doctrinal ones, the attempt
thus far has been to resist introducing policy arguments that have no
direct parallel or referent in Credit Suisse. Having made the narrow case,
this Part broadens the analysis, introducing additional arguments in
favor of patent law preempting antitrust law for which Credit Suisse
appears to at least pave the way, if not provide full endorsement.
Specifically, the following subsections explore four arguments in
favor of preemption relying on the unique interplay between patent
law and antitrust law; arguments that were therefore necessarily
absent from the securities-antitrust analysis of Credit Suisse. First,
patent terms provide a built-in time limit on any particular
anticompetitive scheme. Second, the anticompetitive effects of
schemes requiring patentable innovation are offset, at least in part, by
increased incentives to innovate. Third, the patent-antitrust overlap
threatens not only to distort patent doctrine, as explored in Part IV,
but also antitrust doctrine. Fourth, at least some anticompetitive
problems in the patent sphere are themselves the result of antitrust
intervention. These four arguments support the notion that the
benefits of antitrust intervention are particularly low—and the costs
particularly high—where patents are concerned. Consistent with the
logic of Credit Suisse, these arguments offer additional support for
strongly considering preemption.
A. Patent Expiration and Unwinding Schemes
The preemption analysis undertaken by the Credit Suisse Court,
following on Trinko and NYNEX, was essentially based on cost-benefit
analysis: the costs of antitrust intervention are generally quite high,283
and the existence of an alternative supervisory regime undercuts
most potential benefits.284 In Credit Suisse, the supervision and tools
of the SEC made the need for antitrust intervention “unusually small”
in the securities context.285 In the patent context, there are similar
283. See supra notes 8–15 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 19–35 and accompanying text.
285. Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 283.
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alternative sources of supervision, as outlined in Part II. But even
where these sources are lacking, anticompetitive patent schemes—
unlike anticompetitive securities schemes—have a built-in expiration
date that further reduces the benefits of antitrust intervention: the
end of the patent term.
For applications filed on or after June 8, 1995, the patent term is
twenty years from filing,286 provided that maintenance fees are properly
paid.287 Once the patent term expires, the patent is no longer
enforceable, and competitors are free to practice its claims.288
Therefore, even absent any supervision or intervention, most of the
types of patent schemes analyzed in Part III will eventually self-destruct.
Attempts to peg royalty rates to the sales of an unrelated product, for
example, necessarily unwind when royalties are no longer due.
This stands in stark comparison to most anticompetitive schemes,
which gain strength as market power is consolidated over time and
threaten to continue in perpetuity absent intervention.289 This threat
of anticompetitive equilibrium is in part what justifies the costly
Where an
application of antitrust law in the first place.290
anticompetitive scheme is inherently unstable or short-lived, on the
other hand, the benefits of antitrust intervention are minimized.291 As

286. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2)(2012).
287. Id. § 41(b)(1).
288. Id. § 154(a)(2).
289. A firm that uses predatory pricing to consolidate market share, for example,
may then use its dominant position to capitalize on barriers to entry, such as
economies of scale, network effects, or vertical integration, making its predation even
harder to overcome. See, e.g., ARTHUR O’SULLIVAN & STEVEN M. SHEFFRIN, ECONOMICS:
PRINCIPLES IN ACTION 153 (2003); R. Preston McAfee et al., What Is a Barrier to Entry?,
94 AM. ECON. REV. 461, 461 (2004).
290. See Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 284.
291. Antitrust scholars have made an analogous point in the cartel context.
Cartels, groups of competitors that all agree to charge some supracompetitive price,
are considered inherently unstable. Every member in the group has an incentive to
charge less than the agreed-upon price and thereby capture the entire market as the
cheapest seller. See ADI AYAL, FAIRNESS IN ANTITRUST: PROTECTING THE STRONG FROM
THE WEAK 52 (2014) (“Since cheating is undeniably lucrative, a cartel is inherently
unstable, and thus will defeat itself over time.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW
67 (2d ed. 2001) (“[C]artel[s] [are] rife with inducements and temptations to
cheating, as is confirmed by the history of actual cartels, which are usually quite
unstable even when not forced underground by antitrust enforcement.”). As a
result, scholars argue, the benefits of antitrust intervention against cartels are
minimal and do not generally justify the associated costs. See, e.g., DOMINICK T.
ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST: THE CASE FOR REPEAL 90 (2d ed. 1999); ROBERT H. BORK,
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 196 (1978).
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a result, the cost-benefit analysis for antitrust intervention where
patents are concerned leans even more heavily in favor of preemption.
B. Monopolist Profits and Incentives to Innovate
To return to the outset of this Article, antitrust law’s primary goal is
to “proscribe unreasonable restraints of competition” and thereby
ensure efficient competitive market operation.292
“[T]he core
reason” that antitrust scholars oppose monopolies and price fixing is
because of the associated “deadweight loss.”293
That is, the
monopolist or price fixer does not merely transfer wealth out of the
pockets of consumers into its own; it prevents otherwise mutually
beneficial transactions from occurring, “injur[ing] both the excluded
consumers and the economy more broadly as inefficient substitution
takes place.”294 That deadweight loss effect, however, is minimized
where anticompetitive patent behavior is at issue due to increased
incentives to innovate.
When patentable innovation occurs, the entire economy benefits.
“[N]ew products and processes,” as well as “improvements in . . .
productivity,” permit more mutually beneficial transactions to occur
and grow the economy in a process essentially opposite that of
deadweight loss.295 Incentives to innovate therefore affect economic
growth. The potential to enact an anticompetitive patent scheme
may form such an incentive.
Anticompetitive schemes are generally quite profitable, and a
potential innovator deciding whether to invest additional time and
money into research and development would take the possibility of
such profits into account. Even if an anticompetitive patent scheme
causes some deadweight loss, the extent that the economy grows—
either directly by the patent used in the scheme or indirectly by
increased incentives to innovate—may offset any deadweight losses in

292. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981).
293. Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Damages and Deadweight Loss, in THE
ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST INJURY AND FIRM-SPECIFIC DAMAGES 45, 45 (Kevin S. Marshall
ed., 2008).
294. Id. For background information on the mechanics of deadweight loss, see
generally N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 163–70 (2014).
295. ABBY JOSEPH COHEN, GOLDMAN SACHS, INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 4
(2012), http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/gsr.pdf
(connecting innovation to improved living standards). See generally DAVID WARSH,
KNOWLEDGE AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS: A STORY OF ECONOMIC DISCOVERY xv–xvii
(2006); David Ahlstrom, Innovation and Growth: How Business Contributes to Society, 24
ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 11, 11 (2010).
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the long run.296 This is, of course, the same logic underpinning the
patent system in the first place: temporarily monopolistic practices
are tolerated in exchange for incentivizing innovation.297
Naturally, this line of reasoning has its limits. The returns from
incentivizing even the most groundbreaking innovation can
eventually be swallowed by sufficiently egregious patent schemes.
While a typical anticompetitive scheme does little more than line the
pockets of the perpetrator, an anticompetitive scheme that first
requires patentable innovation offers at least some returns to society
as a whole. And to the extent that patent-related anticompetitive
schemes are more likely to provide at least some offsetting long-term
economic benefits compared to non-patent schemes, the costs of
antitrust intervention will be less justified on the margins where
patents are involved.
C. Doctrinal Distortions in Antitrust
The analysis in Part IV examines the extent that conflicting
guidance and requirements are likely to emerge if antitrust law and
patent law are permitted to overlap. That analysis focused primarily
on the damage that overlap would do to patent law: from disrupting
the “fine, complex, detailed line[s]” of patent doctrines to
improperly interpreting patents due to a lack of requisite
“expertise.”298 But as antitrust law increasingly attempts to supervise
patent activity, antitrust law itself is at risk of warping as well.
For example, antitrust courts have attempted in recent years to
police patent trolls: entities that acquire and enforce patents without
296. This is particularly likely to be true because the anticompetitive scheme
eventually expires but the new technology will continue to be available in perpetuity.
See supra notes 286–91 and accompanying text.
297. See, e.g., Jeremy Bentham, Manual of Political Economy, in 1 JEREMY BENTHAM’S
ECONOMIC WRITINGS 263 (Werner Stark ed., 1952) (“A patent considered as a
recompense for the encrease [sic] given to the general stock of wealth by an invention,
as a recompense for industry and genius and ingenuity, is proportionate and essentially
just. No other mode of recompense can merit either one of the other epithet.”); JOHN
STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 932–33 (2d ed. 1929) (“[I]n general an
exclusive privilege, of temporary duration is preferable; because it leaves nothing to any
one’s discretion; because the reward conferred by it depends on the invention’s being
found useful, and the greater the usefulness, the greater the reward; and because it is
paid by the very persons to whom the service is rendered, the consumers of the
commodity.”); ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 712 (1937) (arguing that the
provision of temporary monopoly is “the easiest and most natural way in which the state
can [provide] recompense . . . for hazarding a dangerous and expensive experiment, of
which the public is afterwards to reap the benefit”).
298. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 279, 282 (2007).

SIPE.TO.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

12/15/2016 3:35 PM

PREEMPTING CONFLICT

473

actually practicing them.299 The troll business model—acquiring
licensing fees from entities that actually do create goods and services—
has led many academics and policymakers to characterize them as a
pure anticompetitive nuisance worthy of antitrust intervention.300 But
there are “clear doctrinal . . . roadblocks to leveraging antitrust law” to
police much of patent troll behavior, ranging from “quasiconstitutional” protections to textual limitations.301
In terms of constitutional protections, the Supreme Court has
established that the First Amendment’s protection of the right to
petition grants presumptive immunity from liability under the
antitrust laws for “attempts to influence the passage or enforcement
of laws,” such as patent infringement suits.302 This immunity applies
even when a suit is brought with anticompetitive intent:
Joint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust
laws even though intended to eliminate competition. Such conduct is not
illegal, either standing alone or as part of a broader scheme itself
violative of the Sherman Act. The jury should have been so
instructed and, given the obviously telling nature of this evidence,
we cannot hold this lapse to be mere harmless error.303

299. BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AN OVERVIEW OF THE “PATENT TROLLS”
DEBATE 4 (2013), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42668.pdf.
300. See Carrier, supra note 125, at 11–12; Collin A. Rose, Note, A Match Made for
Court: Patent Assertion Entities and the Federal Trade Commission, 48 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 95, 139 (2014); Bert Foer & Sandeep Vaheesan, Patent Trolls in the Cross Hairs,
AM. ANTITRUST INST. (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/content/pate
nt-trolls-cross-hairs (arguing that the Department of Justice and the FTC should
bypass Congress and take action pursuant to their existing authority); Gene Sperling,
Taking on Patent Trolls to Protect American Innovation, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (June 4,
2013, 1:55 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/06/04/taking-patent-trollsprotect-american-innovation (arguing that patent trolls are responsible for “an
explosion of abusive patent litigation designed not to reward innovation . . . but to
threaten companies in order to extract settlements based on questionable claims”);
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION 12 (2013),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf.
301. Sipe, supra note 8, at 191, 223.
302. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135
(1961). For examples of the application of this immunity doctrine specifically to
patent trolls, see In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 903, 922
(N.D. Ill. 2013); Steven Seidenberg, Patent Trolls Are Getting First Amendment Protection
J.
(May
1,
2014,
9:00
AM),
for
Their
Demand
Letters,
ABA
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/patent_trolls_are_getting_first_amen
dment_protection_for_demand_letters.
303. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965)
(emphasis added).
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The only exception to this immunity is where a lawsuit is a “sham,”
determined by a two-prong test: (1) the suit “must be objectively
baseless,” such that “no reasonable litigant could realistically expect
success on the merits,” and (2) the suit must be brought with the
“subjective motivation” to interfere with a competitor through
“governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that process.”304
However, neither prong is likely to be met in many troll cases. With
regard to the first prong, the patent quality of troll portfolios is
generally at least as high as portfolios owned by non-trolls,305 and
patents owned by trolls tend to fare no better or worse on average in
reexamination proceedings.306 With regards to the second prong, troll
plaintiffs genuinely hope to succeed on the merits. Trolls, by
definition, do not participate in the actual product market—and
hence are not in competition with the product sellers—so merely
hurting producers through nuisance litigation does them no good. A
successful infringement suit, on the other hand, grants them damages.
As a result, for antitrust law to reach patent trolls, arguably the most
important carve-out from antitrust liability307 would need to be eroded.
In terms of textual limitations, in the types of patent troll cases
where immunity does not apply, commentators have frequently
suggested using section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act as the
doctrinal hook for antitrust enforcement.308 The scope of section 5—
prohibiting any “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting

304. Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49,
60–61 (1993).
305. See Timo Fischer & Joachim Henkel, Patent Trolls on Markets for Technology—An
Empirical Analysis of NPEs’ Patent Acquisitions, 41 RES. POL’Y 1519, 1519 (2012); see also
Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 458, 481 (2012).
306. See Steve Moore, A Fractured Fairytale Part 3: More Patent Troll Myths, IP
WATCHDOG (July 31, 2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/07/31/a-facturedfairytale-part-3-more-patent-troll-myths/id=43755.
307. See, e.g., M. Sean Royall & Seth M.M. Stodder, From Burlington Northern to
Baltimore Scrap, 15 ANTITRUST, Summer 2001, at 47, 51 (2001) (“There is a clear
public interest in ensuring that meritorious claims are brought before the courts,
irrespective of the subjective motivations of the claimants or their supporters . . .
many important cases concerning vital public interests . . . might [otherwise] never
be brought into court and resolved.”).
308. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012); see Thibault Schrepel, Patent Privateering: Patents as
Weapons, U. CIN. L. REV. (Feb. 19, 2015), http://uclawreview.org/2015/02/19/patent
-privateering-patents-as-weapons (explaining the absence of a legal claim against the
mere existence of a patent troll); Carrier, supra note 125, at 11–12 (suggesting section 5
as a vehicle for the FTC to address patent trolling); Popofsky & Laufert, supra note 145,
at 12; Comments of Google et al., supra note 150, at 3–4; Comments of Philip Malone,
Patent Assertion Entities Activities Workshop, supra note 149, at 156, 162.
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commerce”309—is quite broad. This breadth makes it a seemingly
natural tool against a novel threat like patent trolls, who do not appear
to implicate other antitrust laws.310 But the use of section 5 as a catchall to expand antitrust law’s reach has significant drawbacks. Critics
rightly point out the “apparent absence of limiting principles” in both
section 5’s language311 and interpretation,312 and the commensurate
risk of uncertainty and rent-seeking generated by its application in
novel contexts.313 Attempts to police patent trolls only exacerbate this
increasingly atextual approach to antitrust enforcement.
Hence, if antitrust law is to play a role in policing patent troll
activity, it would first have to “distort” antitrust law in order to do
so,314 whether by overriding key doctrinal carve-outs or by permitting
atextual expansion. Either way, the existing risk of false antitrust
positives and chilling effects associated with antitrust intervention is
increased significantly. In comparison, patent law may already have
the tools to curtail troll behavior.315 Where, as in the context of
patent trolls, antitrust law must be stretched or distorted in order to
reach patent activity, the benefits of preemption as an alternative are
therefore substantial.
D. Antitrust Solutions Causing Antitrust Problems
Paradoxically, antitrust involvement in the patent sphere itself
occasionally generates anticompetitive problems. A key example of

309. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
310. See, e.g., Sipe, supra note 8, at 191, 194 (examining some of the shortcomings
of applying the Sherman Act to troll activity).
311. William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, Competition Policy and the Application of
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 929, 942 (2010).
312. James Cooper, The Limits of Section 5’s Scope Beyond the Sherman Act, TRUTH ON
THE MARKET (Aug. 1, 2013), http://truthonthemarket.com/tag/sherman-act/
(asserting that FTC Commissioners essentially define illegal action under section 5).
But see Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair Methods of Competition” Under
Section 5 of the FTC Act, FTC (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/docu
ments/public_statements/735201/150813section5enforcement.pdf (outlining broad
principles “intended to provide a framework” for the exercise of section 5 authority,
such as “the promotion of consumer welfare”).
313. James Campbell Cooper, The Perils of Excessive Discretion: The Elusive Meaning
of Unfairness in Section 5 of the FTC Act, 3 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 87, 91, 117–18
(2015); Joshua D. Wright, Revisiting Antitrust Institutions: The Case for Guidelines to
Recalibrate the Federal Trade Commission’s Section 5 Unfair Methods of Competition Authority,
2013 CONCURRENCES, at 1, 2 (articulating the concern that a lack of continuity in FTC
Commissioners will result in inconsistent agency action).
314. Sipe, supra note 8, at 203.
315. See supra Part III.
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this occurrence comes from the standard-setting context. As noted in
Section III.A, SSOs are concerned with the potential for a patent
owner to charge an exorbitant royalty rate after its technology has
been incorporated into a standard and implementers are thereby
effectively “locked-in.”316 As a result, before incorporating a known
patented technology into a standard, SSOs will frequently require
patent owners to agree in advance to license its technology on certain
favorable terms.317
However, SSOs are constrained in their ability to engage in such ex
ante negotiations due to antitrust interference. An SSO requiring all
standard-implicating patent owners to license at a given rate may be
characterized as a price-fixing cartel—a serious Sherman Act
violation.318 As a result, SSOs use “licensing obligations [that] are left
intentionally vague to avert price-fixing liability.”319 Typically, these
obligations take the form of nebulous “FRAND” terms: the patentee
is asked to agree to license on “fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms.”320
This intentional ambiguity unfortunately comes at the cost of
enforceability:
Despite the appeal of FRAND commitments, a consistent, practical,
and readily enforceable definition of FRAND has proven difficult to
achieve. Virtually no [SSO] defines what this elusive phrase means,
and many [SSOs] affirmatively disclaim any role in establishing,
interpreting, or adjudicating the reasonableness of FRAND licensing
terms. In fact, some [SSOs] go so far as to prohibit discussions of

316. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 141–44 and accompanying text.
318. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Standardizing Government Standard-Setting Policy for
Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 745, 753 (1999) (“The Antitrust Division
of the Department of Justice has even taken action against the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute for compelling members to relinquish
[infringement claims] in the standards it promulgates.”); Patrick D. Curran,
Comment, Standard-Setting Organizations: Patents, Price Fixing, and Per Se Legality, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 983, 1000–01 (2003) (arguing that an SSO should be concerned about
the possibility of being found liable under several antitrust theories); see also U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.1, at 24 (1995) (“[H]orizontal restraints [arising from
joint patent ventures] often will be evaluated under the rule of reason. In some
circumstances, however, that analysis may be truncated . . . some restraints may merit
per se treatment, including price fixing . . . .”).
319. Curran, supra note 318, at 983.
320. Layne-Farrar et al., supra note 141, at 671 (expressing concern that FRAND
requirements are not sufficiently established).
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royalties and other licensing terms at [SSO] meetings, making the
development of any consensus view unlikely.321

As a result, there has been considerable litigation between
patentees and SSOs over the meaning of their FRAND obligations—
leaving courts to the thankless task of determining, for example, what
a “reasonable” price for a given patent license is.322 Scholars and
policymakers have already proposed antitrust intervention as a
solution to these attempts to “exploit the ambiguities” of FRAND
commitments.323 But these proposals consistently fail to observe the
role that antitrust played in creating and perpetuating these
ambiguities in the first place.
In other words, antitrust law has created an anticompetitive
problem in the patent sphere, and the existence of that
anticompetitive problem is now being used as a justification for
greater antitrust intervention. In cases such as this, preemption
offers an out. Antitrust intervention, on the other hand, merely
ensures its own necessity.
CONCLUSION
Supreme Court precedent suggests that preemption may offer an
elegant resolution to the escalating tension between patent law and
antitrust law. The PTO, the ITC, and the Federal Circuit already
exercise considerable regulatory authority over the patent sphere—in
particular over patent schemes involving licensing leverage or
informational asymmetry. Permitting antitrust law to overlap with
this patent authority is likely to do more harm than good due to the
complex doctrinal lines governing patent conduct, the contradictory
inferences that patent law and antitrust law necessitate, the high
degree of expertise necessary to adjudicate patent issues, and the
considerable risk of forum-shopping. The Supreme Court has
already found this combination—alternative supervision and risk of
conflict—sufficiently compelling to preempt antitrust law in the

321. Jorge L. Contreras, Fixing FRAND: A Pseudo-Pool Approach to Standards-Based
Patent Licensing, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 47, 51–52 (2013) (footnote omitted).
322. Id. at 95–97 (indexing the major FRAND disputes from 1995–2012).
323. Renata Hesse, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust
Div., Remarks for the ITU-T Patent Roundtable, Six “Small” Proposals for SSOs
Before Lunch 11 (Oct. 10, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518951/download;
George S. Cary et al., The Case for Antitrust Law to Police the Patent Holdup Problem in
Standard Setting, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 913 (2011); Christopher B. Hockett & Rosanna G.
Lipscomb, Best FRANDs Forever? Standard-Setting Antitrust Enforcement in the United
States and the European Union, 23 ANTITRUST, Summer 2009, at 19, 19–22.
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securities sphere. But the case for patent law preempting antitrust
law is even stronger due to the unique nature of patents and the
interplay—and tension—that patent law alone has with antitrust law.
The inherent time limit on anticompetitive patent schemes, the
economic effects of increased incentives to innovate, the risks of
warping antitrust doctrine to cover patent activity, and the selfdefeating effects that antitrust intervention has had thus far all
suggest that where patents are concerned, the benefits of antitrust
intervention are even lower—and the costs much higher.

